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Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confessions and 
Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases*
STEPHEN C. THAMAN
1. Introduction
The “full-blown” trial with “all the guarantees”1 is no longer affordable. With 
the rise in crime and the more cost-, and labor-intensive procedures required 
by modern notions of due process, legislatures and courts are gradually giving 
priority to the principle of “procedural economy” and introducing forms of 
consensual and abbreviated criminal procedures to deal with overloaded 
dockets. After decades of biting criticism of American plea bargaining as a 
form of “bargaining with justice,”2 one cannot help but recognize a “triumphal 
march of consensual [and other less costly] procedural forms.”3
* Session VB.
National Reports received from: Brazil (BR), A. P. Zomer; Bulgaria (BU), J. Iontcheva Turner; 
Croatia (CR), D. Krapac; Denmark (DE), R.Wandall; Germany (GE), K. Altenhain; Italy (IT), 
M. Ferraioli; Norway (NO), A. Strandbakken; Netherlands (NE), C. H. Brants-Langeraar; 
Poland (PO), M. Rogacka-Rzewnicka; South Africa (SA), A. Skeen; Scotland (SC), F. Leverick 
& P. Duff; Spain (SP), C. Samanes Ara; US, J. Ross. 
1 Art. 24 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution guarantees to those accused of crimes the right to 
a defense, to the assistance of counsel, as well as “a public trial without undue delays and with 
all the guarantees …” Constitución Espanola de 17 de Diciembre de 1978 (BOE no. 311, Dec. 
29, 1978 [RCL 1978, 2836]), text reprinted in J. Muerza Esparza (Ed.), Ley de Enjuiciamiento 
Criminal y otras Normas Procesales (1998).
2 Cf. K. F. Schumann, Der Handel mit der Gerechtigkeit (1977).
3 Th. Weigend, Die Reform des Strafverfahrens. Europäische und deutsche Tendenzen und 
Probleme, l04 Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 486, 493 (l992).
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591467 
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 “Consensual” procedural forms are part and parcel of criminal procedure 
reforms worldwide and are driven by the desire for procedural economy: to 
either avoid the formal preliminary investigation by investigating magistrate 
or prosecutor and the preparation of an exhaustive investigative dossier, 
typical of inquisitorial systems patterned after the continental European 
“civil law” model of criminal procedure, or the formal, oral, increasingly 
adversarial trial which has been complicated by the increase in procedural 
guarantees given to criminal defendants and rendered more unpredictable to 
the extent that lay judges are given control over the issue of guilt.4 As these 
reforms are instituted, one hears the complaints of legal scholars who bemoan 
a compromise of important principles of criminal procedure, most important 
among them being the compromise of the search for truth and the legality 
principle, requiring mandatory prosecution as a guarantee of equal protection 
before the law.5 The dispute over the advisability of guilty pleas and plea-
bargaining is probably at its most heated in relation to the introduction of plea-
bargaining in the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), where one is dealing with crimes against 
humanity, genocide and mass murders which require a delicate balancing of: 
(1) the economic interests of the international community which funds the 
court; (2) the interests of victims and the international community in having 
the perpetrator accept responsibility for their acts and express remorse; and 
(3) the interest of the international community, the parties to the confl ict and 
the victims in having a full and accurate historical record of the events during 
the confl ict.6
 This report will explore the various types of consensual procedures which 
make up the procedural arsenals of modern criminal justice systems and try 
to fl esh out how and if they have contributed to procedural economy in the 
respective country and whether or not important procedural principles have 
been compromised which undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system. I sent an elaborate questionnaire7 to the country reporters8 which, 
4 See M. Damaska, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 
1018, 1022-23 (2004)
5 A. Eser, Funktionswandel von Prozeßmaximen, 104 Zeitschrift für die Gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft 361, 373 (1992).
6 G.-J. A. Knoops, Theory and Practice of International and Internationalized Criminal 
Proceedings 264 (2005). Cf. Damaska, supra note 4, at 1031, who feels that admissions 
in exchange for a reduced sentence will not necessarily have a salutary impact, but “if his 
self-incrimination appears to be motivated by a change of heart rather than by personal risk 
calculations, then his self-condemnation can exert a strong effect on his followers, making them 
more likely to confront the reprehensible nature of their own conduct.”
7 See Appendix 1.
8 This report will refer to the country reports provided by the respective rapporteurs and to 
other materials gathered by the general rapporteur. For citation purposes, I will use a two-
letter abbreviation for the country (usually the fi rst two letters), and the page number of the 
report. The contribution from Prof. Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, University of Utrecht, on 
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besides addressing the forms of consensual resolution of criminal cases such 
as diversion, penal orders, stipulations to the correctness of the charges, plea 
bargains or confession bargaining, also sought certain basic information 
about the relative complexity and formality of both the mode of pretrial 
investigation and the mode of trial used in the respective countries. This is 
important, for the more complicated and formal the pretrial stage, the more 
necessities of procedural economy will favor simplifying or leaping this stage 
of the proceedings. The same holds true for the relative complexity, and, in 
the case of jury trials, the relative unpredictability of the mode of trial,9 which 
will lead to increased use of plea-bargaining or other mechanisms to simplify 
or avoid the full-blown criminal trial.
 The country rapporteurs were also asked about the amount of discretion 
prosecutors have in charging cases, or in dismissing charges (during negotiations 
for instance) for countries with complete prosecutorial discretion (opportunity 
principle) such as the US might tend to have less theoretical aversion to plea-
bargaining10 whereas those which deny prosecutorial discretion (legality 
principle)11 are usually antipathetical to “bargaining with justice.” As can be 
seen in the country reports, most countries following the “legality principle” 
have allowed a certain level of discretion in charging, based on assessments 
of the prospect of a conviction,12 and have also introduced the “opportunity 
principle” for less serious crimes,13 thus opening the door for diversion, penal 
orders and consensual resolution of the less serious cases. In Denmark and 
the Netherlands, prosecutorial guidelines determine what kinds of crimes 
are subject to discretionary prosecution.14 In the Netherlands, negotiations 
International Criminal Tribunals, is from his book, supra note 6. I have consulted a number of 
other codes of criminal procedure of countries for which no country report was available. These 
codes are listed in Appendix 2 and use a similar abbreviated format. For instance, cites to the 
Moldovan Code of Criminal Procedure will be in the following format: MO (§425 CCP).
9 Damaska, supra note 4, at 1022-23, emphasizing the function of unpredictability in this 
sense.
10 US (p. 1), where plea bargaining is wide-open. But Norway, while recognizing the opportunity 
principle if there are “weighty reasons” for not charging, NO (pp. 1-2), is a country that 
generally frowns on plea-bargaining. SC (pp. 1-2) clearly recognizes the opportunity principle 
but prosecutorial guidelines tend to map out the areas where discretion should normally be 
exercised; SA (pp. 1-3) also recognizes the opportunity principle across the board, but frowns 
on plea bargaining. France, which also recognizes the opportunity principle, was a great enemy 
of plea-bargaining as well, until 2004.
11 For countries generally accepting the legality principle: GE (p. 1); DE (pp. 2-3, 13-14); NE 
(p. 2); CR (p. 2); BU (p. 3); PO (p. 1); BR (p. 1); see also IT (p. 1), where the principle is 
enshrined in Art. 112 of the Constitution.
12 For instance: IT (p. 1); DE (pp. 3-6, 14-15); NE (p. 2).
13 See BR (p. 1); PO (p. 1); CR (p. 2); GE (p. 10). Langer sees a softening of the legality 
principle in Guatemala (1994), Costa Rica (1998) and Chile (2000-2003) as well. M. Langer, 
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1, 28 (2004).
14 DE (pp. 5-6); NE (pp. 4-5).
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between prosecution and defense before charging probably only happens, and 
then secretly, when the prosecutor is facing a more powerful adversary, such 
as a defense lawyer representing a powerful enterprise charged with a white 
collar offense or an organized crime syndicate.15
 Prosecutorial discretion not to charge is also limited in many countries 
by procedures which allow the aggrieved party (whether victim or relatives 
of deceased victims) to seek to compel the prosecutor to charge,16 or even 
to bring charges themselves independently through private prosecution.17 
In many jurisdictions a judge will perform a screening function to weed out 
groundless charges presented by the public prosecutor or even victims acting 
as private prosecutors.18 This was traditionally the function of the investigating 
magistrate in inquisitorial systems,19 is carried out by a pretrial judge in other 
systems,20 and even by the trial judge in a pretrial hearing on occasion.21 Once 
a case has been charged, the prosecutor will often require the consent of a 
judge, usually the trial judge,22 to dismiss the charges, and here too the victim 
15 NE (pp. 2-3).
16 Classically the German Klageerzwingungsverfahren allows the victim to appeal to a judge 
to compel prosecution, GE (p. 13); NE (p. 9, “Article 12 Procedure”). Similarly: BU (p. 3); IT 
(p. 5). In Poland, the judge can compel the prosecutor to twice review the case and if he or she 
refuses to charge, the victim may proceed through private prosecution, PO (pp. 8-11). In the US 
(p. 1) there is no right to private prosecution, nor to ask a judge to compel prosecution. In SC 
(p. 6) the victim has a theoretical right to compel prosecution in serious “solemn” cases, but this 
remedy has only been granted two times in Scottish history. In other countries there is only a 
right to appeal to a hierarchically higher prosecutor, DE (p. 15); NO (p. 3); BR (p. 2). In SC (p. 
5) the prosecutor, since 2005, is required to give the victim a written explanation why charges 
were not preferred, but there is no way to get a judge to compel charging.
17 A complaint of the victim is required for public prosecution of certain minor offenses, and 
even rape in some countries: PO (p. 2). It is required for statutory rape in NE (p. 8). Private 
prosecution without obligatory participation of the public prosecutor is allowed for minor 
offenses in GE (pp. 14-15); DE (p. 15); CR (pp. 6-7); NO (p. 4, only for defamation); BU (p. 5); 
BR (p. 2); IT (p. 5). The victim may participate as an auxiliary prosecutor with full procedural 
rights sitting alongside the public prosecutor in PO (p. 7), Spain, and Germany, a provision 
mainly for sexual assault cases.
18 No such judicial screening exists in NE (p. 7) or SC (pp. 3-4).
19 For the French procedure as related to victim’s complaints, see S. C. Thaman, Comparative 
Criminal Procedure: A Casebook Approach 21-23 (2002). See also CR (p. 5-6), where the 
investigating magistrate’s rejection may be reviewed by a panel of three judges if the prosecutor 
refuses to dismiss, a procedure similar to that in France. 
20 See SA (p. 1); the giudice dell’udienza preliminare in IT (p. 4). In SA (p. 1) and US, in the 
case of preliminary hearings, the procedure is public and adversarial. W. R. la Fave et al., 
Criminal Procedure 714-39 (4th ed. 2004). But the US also is the only country still using the 
highly secret, inquisitorial grand jury, a group of anywhere from 6 to 23 lay persons which 
screens prosecutorial charges without any defense participation. Id. at 740-796.
21 GE (p. 9); PO (p. 10); BR (p. 2).
22 NE (pp. 9-10); BU (p. 6); PO (p. 12); BR (p. 3); IT (p. 5). Minor exceptions are allowed in 
some countries: in GE (p. 12, 18) for individual charges in multi-count accusatory pleadings, 
and cases subject to victim-offender conciliation and other narrow categories of offenses; in DE 
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may have a role in seeing that the case continues on to trial and judgment 
according to the normal procedures.23
 It is also important to know whether the pretrial investigation yields 
a comprehensive fi le or dossier from which trial judges (and parties) can 
evaluate whether the evidence is suffi cient to prove guilt in cases of consensual 
resolution. The investigative fi le of classic inquisitorial systems which was 
supposed to be the repository of all admissible evidence and whose contents, 
whether in the form of witness statements, reports of investigative acts, or 
expert reports, were all presumptively admissible,24 would naturally provide 
an excellent documentary basis for the fi nding of guilt in a case which did not 
go to trial.25 The informal police investigation,26 which, as in the U.S., only 
produces isolated police reports and witness statements which are not always 
subject to full disclosure to the defense, would tend to be the least reliable 
basis for assessing the factual basis for a guilty plea.27
 Reforms in formerly inquisitorial countries are, however, gradually 
changing the methodology and the aims of the formal preliminary 
investigation. First, the preliminary investigation has been opened up to more 
defense participation in the form of the ability to make evidentiary motions 
before the chief investigator, whether it be investigating magistrate,28 public 
(pp. 16-17) for cases punishable by fi nes, juvenile cases, etc. In SC (pp. 6-7), no decision of the 
public prosecutor to dismiss has ever been judicially reviewed, despite a theoretical possibility 
to do so. If the public prosecutor moves to dismiss in a case where victim is acting as auxiliary 
or private prosecutor, in some countries the victim may continue prosecuting the case, DE (p. 
17); CR (p. 7). 
23 In BU (pp. 6-7) the victim may assume responsibility for the prosecution in such cases. The 
public prosecutor has unlimited power to dismiss charges without judicial approval in SA (p. 
3); CR (p. 7); NO (p. 4). In Spain, the aggrieved party may act as private prosecutor and any 
member of the public as “popular prosecutor” in any criminal case independently of whether 
the public prosecutor intends to continue with the prosecution. See Thaman, supra note 19, at 
23-28. 
24 This holds true in Russia and many of the former Soviet republics. It presumably holds true 
in France, NE (pp. 3-4), CR (p. 1) and other countries that have maintained the investigating 
magistrate and the formal preliminary investigation. In Brazil, the entire investigative fi le is 
given to the jury when they retire to deliberate. §476 Código de Processo Penal, in D. E. De 
Jesus (Ed.), Código de Processo Penal Anotado (7th ed. 1989).
25 It also allows the judge to take an active role in assessing whether there is a factual basis for 
the guilty plea. Langer, supra note 13, at 15.
26 DE (p. 5); SA (p. 1); NO (p. 1); SC (p. 1).
27 Langer notes that reforms have reduced the importance of the written dossier in Italy (1989), 
Argentina (federal) 1992, Guatemala (1994), Buenos Aires (1998), Paraguay (1999), Venezuela 
(1999), Chile (2000-03). Langer, supra note 13, at 28.
28 CR (p. 3); this is also true in France and Spain in the jury trial cases and perhaps in abbreviated 
procedure cases.
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prosecutor29 or other offi cial.30 The theory behind the prohibition of defense 
investigations was typically the notion that pretrial contact with a witness by a 
party contaminated the witness, undermining his or her credibility.31 In some 
countries there is a theoretical right of the defense, in cases where a suspect has 
been arrested and preliminarily charged, to be present during all investigative 
acts and to actively solicit evidence in an adversarial type setting.32 Finally, Italy 
took the radical step, which has been followed in other countries, to declare 
the prima facie inadmissibility of all evidence collected in the preliminary 
investigation dossier, unless it cannot be repeated at trial, thus requiring the 
parties to conduct depositions of witnesses with full confrontation rights of 
their adversaries when there is a danger the witness will not be available for 
trial due to death, illness, or illegal threats.33 In addition, Italy has not only 
accorded the defense the right to conduct its own pretrial investigations,34 as 
occurs in the United States and other common law countries,35 but has set out 
codifi ed guidelines for the defense collection of evidence and its preservation 
in a defense fi le, which is then consolidated with the fi le of the prosecutor at 
the end of the pretrial phase.36
 The more comprehensive and two-sided the pretrial investigation and the 
more adversarial the taking of evidence in the pretrial stages, the more the 
consensual modes of trial, whether in the form of guilty pleas, stipulations or 
abbreviated trials, will be able to make claims of truth-approximation. This 
theoretical approach has its adherents in Germany, where several voices in the 
literature have called for again making the preliminary investigation the most 
important stage in the criminal process to the extent it performs the function 
of comprehensively collecting the evidence while protecting the defense right 
to put it to an adversarial test. Thus, consensual resolution will be on fi rm 
footing and, if consensus is not achieved, the trial itself can be streamlined due 
29 The Netherlands, perhaps the most inquisitorial country in Europe, allows no independent 
defense investigation, compelling the defense to funnel any evidence through the prosecutor 
and/or investigating magistrate, NE (pp. 1-2, 5). In GE (p. 2), the prosecutor must question 
witnesses suggested by the defense, but they can also be subpoenaed directly to testify at trial.
30 In Russia, an investigator attached to the Ministry of the Interior heads the investigation, 
under supervision of the public prosecutor, and can hear motions of the defense. RU (§§46, 47, 
86 CCP). The defense must ask the police to question a witness in NO (p. 2).
31 NE (p. 5). BR (p. 1) also prohibits independent defense collection of evidence.
32 For instance in Spain. See Thaman, supra note 19, at 34-39.
33 In relation to Italy, and the procedure before the Spanish jury courts, see S. C. Thaman, Spain 
Returns to Trial by Jury, 22 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 241, 281-82 (1998).
34 Many countries allow defense investigations, either in an informal uncodifi ed manner, GE 
(p. 2), DE (p. 6), CR (p. 2), or while codifi ed, without procedural clarifi cation of the rules to be 
followed or the admissibility of the fruits thereof, NO (p. 2).
35 SC (p. 2).
36 IT (p. 2, §§391 bis et seq. CPP-Italy); N. Triggiani, La L. 7 diciembre 2000 N. 397 (Disposizioni 
in materia di indagini difensive): Prime rifl essioni, Cassazione Penale (2001), Nos. 7-8, #1120, 
at 2272-91.
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to the pretrial preservation of crucial sources of evidence.37 There is, however, 
a real danger if consensual (or other alternative) procedures lead to a skipping 
of both a formal preliminary investigation and a formal trial, for it will then be 
diffi cult for the sentencing judge to ascertain whether there is a factual basis 
for a fi nding of guilt.38
 Certain procedural mechanisms not necessarily related to the giving of 
consent by the defendant can, however, achieve the same end of skipping 
the formal preliminary investigation, or avoiding a full trial (by jury) with 
all the guarantees. Typical among these are expedited trials, usually where 
the defendant is arrested in fl agrante or the evidence is otherwise clear due 
to an unequivocal confession or other manifest proof, where the prosecutor, 
without consent of the defendant, can immediately send the case to the trial 
court.39 In cases where the evidence is actually overwhelming, of course, many 
of these cases will not end up in full-blown formal trials, but in consensual 
resolution of one kind or the other. Finally, many countries provide for a more 
expeditious police or prosecution investigation of the case, in lieu of the full-
blown preliminary investigation, or a complete skipping of the preliminary 
investigation or preliminary hearing40 for less-serious crimes, which could be 
an incentive for a prosecutor to undercharge a case to gain the obvious saving 
of time and investigative resources.
37 Weigend, supra note 3, at 506 ff; J. Wolter, Aspekte einer Strafprozessreform bis 2007 79-91 
(1991).
38 Some voices in countries in transition from an inquisitorial to an adversarial form of procedure, 
feel it is more important to leap over or simplify the cumbersome, pedantic preliminary 
investigation with its long periods of pretrial detention, and maintain a full adversarial trial. 
After all, the state’s incapacity to bring defendants to trial in a reasonable time is the reason for 
long periods of pretrial detention, and yet the state uses this reason for “compelling” defendants 
to accept judgment without trial through its “consensual” procedures.” G. E. Córdoba, El juicio 
abreviado en el Código Procesal Penal de la Nación, in J. B. J. Maier & A. Bovino (Eds.), El 
Procedimiento Abreviado 241-245 (2001), citing Bovino.
39 BU (p. 11); in IT (p. 19), the public prosecutor may skip the preliminary investigation and 
the preliminary hearing in fl agrant cases by choosing giudizio direttissimo or in cases involving 
otherwise clear evidence by choosing a giudizio immediato, which can result in the setting 
of trial within 15 days. See S. C. Thaman, Gerechtigkeit und Verfahrensvielfalt: Logik der 
beschleunigten, konsensuellen und vereinfachten Strafprozessmodelle, in S. Machura & S. 
Ulbrich (Eds.), Recht – Gesellschaft – Kommunikation: Festschrift für Klaus F. Röhl 307-09 
(2003). Venezuela has introduced a similar provision which applies to fl agrant crimes, but also 
to crimes punishable by less than four years deprivation of liberty or fi ne only. VE (§§372-73 
CPP). See also the procedure for “clear crimes, uncovered in the moment of their commission,” 
MO (§513(1) CCP), which requires the police to submit a report of the crime to the prosecutor 
within 12 hours and for the prosecutor, if she believes a crime has been committed, to refer the 
case to the court, which must hear it within fi ve days, with one fi ve-day extension. MO (§§515-
18 CCP); cf. BE (§§452-59 CCP), which provides in clear cases where the suspect does not 
deny responsibility, for submission of the case to the prosecutor within 10 days, whereupon the 
case must be submitted to the judge who must set trial within fi ve days.
40 Id. IT (pp. 8-9).
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 Practices like correctionnalisation in France and Belgium,41 allow 
prosecutors to manipulate the charges so as to avoid the jurisdiction of mixed42 
or jury courts43 with lay participation, or the discretionary charging of “either-
way” offenses in England and Wales which would lead to less complicated 
and more predictable trials before professional panels or, in the latter case, 
by lay magistrates.44 While such procedures do not necessarily require the 
41 Thaman, supra note 19, at 141. On Belgium, see Ch. Van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in Ch. Van 
den Wyngaert (Ed.), Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community 11 (1993).
42 Thus it is important to know which countries have mixed courts for the trial of more serious 
offenses and trials before a professional judge or judges for less serious cases. GE (pp. 19-20), 
has panels of 3 professional and two lay assessors for more serious felonies, like murder, panels 
of one professional judge and two lay assessors for crimes punishable by from 2-4 years and 
single judge trials for lesser offenses; CR (pp. 8-9) has a court composed of one professional 
judge and two lay assessors for crimes punishable by 5-10 years, and of 2 professional judges 
and 3 lay assessors if punishable in excess of 10 years; single judges try cases punishable by 
less than fi ve years; BU (p. 6) provides a mixed court of one professional and two lay judges 
for crimes punishable by from 5-15 years and a mixed court of two professional and three lay 
judges for those punishable in excess of 15 years, with single judges trying cases punishable by 
less than 5 years; in IT (pp. 7-8), a mixed court of six lay judges sitting with two professional 
judges hears all homicides and other cases punishable by imprisonment from 10 to 24 years, 
single judges try cases punishable by up to 4 years, and 3 judge panels the rest; in SA (p. 4) 
lay assessors must be appointed in murder trials and may be used to assess appropriateness 
of sentence in regional courts. Only two Latin American countries have mixed courts: in BO 
(§50 CCP) trial courts are staffed with two professional judges and three lay assessors and in 
the Argentine province of Córdoba, with three professional judges and two lay assessors. R. J. 
Cavallero, La Constitución Argentina. La Realidad Jurídica y un Reciente Ensayo de Tribunal 
Mixto, in J. B. J. Maier et al. (Eds.), Juico por Jurados en el Proceso Penal 52 (2000).
43 For countries with jury trials for more serious crimes and professional panels for the others: 
BR (p. 3, jury of seven, with one professional judge, for crimes against life only); for countries 
with jury trials for more serious crimes, mixed courts for mid-range crimes and professional 
panels for less serious crimes: DE (p. 20, jury of 12 with three professional judges for crime 
punishable in excess of four years, and a mixed court consisting of one professional judge and 
two lay assessors for lesser crimes; if a defendant gives a full confession, however, all cases 
will be tried by a professional judge sitting alone); NO (p. 5, cases punishable by up to six 
years tried by mixed court of one professional judge and two lay assessors, cases punishable 
by in excess of six years, and appeals of the smaller mixed court, tried by mixed court of 3 
professional judges and four lay assessors and appeals from court of 3 professional judges and 
4 lay assessors tried by a jury of 10 sitting with three professional judges); SC (p. 8, jury of 15 
and one professional judge for “solemn” offenses tried in the High Court and punishable by 
life imprisonment); NI (§297 CCP), has a jury of fi ve presided by one professional judge; PA 
(§2332 Judicial Code) has a jury of seven presided by one professional judge. On the relatively 
new Russian jury system, with a jury of 12, and Spanish system, with a jury of nine, both 
presided over by a single judge for the trial of murders and some other offenses, see S. Thaman, 
Europe’s New Jury Systems: the Cases of Spain and Russia, in N. Vidmar (Ed.), World Jury 
Systems 326 (2000).
44 The Netherlands has been historically skeptical of lay participation and has neither a jury nor 
a mixed court and uses three-judge panels for the more serious cases, and single judges for less 
serious cases. NE (pp. 11-12). On ‘either-way’ offenses, see Thaman, supra note 19, at 141-3.
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consent of the defendant,45 they may be preceded by informal discussions or 
negotiations between defense and prosecution and thus, in a sense, be akin 
to plea-bargaining.46 In countries with jury systems, in which the right to 
trial by jury is the right of the accused,47 and not exclusively the right of the 
people to participate in the administration of justice,48 the waiver of the right 
to jury trial could be the subject of negotiations, or could be subtly or not 
too subtly coerced either by manipulative investigators, prosecutors or even 
court-appointed defense lawyers,49 or by, for instance, a system of punishing 
more leniently following a court trial than a jury trial.50
 Finally, I believe it is important to recognize, that recognitions of guilt in 
the form of confessions have been the great simplifi er of criminal procedure 
throughout its often ignominious history. Even where defendants were not 
allowed to jurisdictionally will the end of criminal proceedings by entering 
a plea of guilty, they were regularly either tortured or otherwise compelled, 
threatened, induced, or inveigled to confess to the crime, which served 
traditionally as the “queen of evidence” upon which professional judges, 
juries or mixed courts would determine the guilt of the accused.51 It was the 
great simplifi er even of the formal, exhaustive preliminary investigation of 
classic inquisitorial stamp,52 thus justifying the cessation of the gathering of 
45 In SC (pp. 8-10), the public prosecutor has almost complete freedom to choose whether trial 
will be by jury in the High Court, by “solemn” (full-blown) procedure in the Sheriff’s Court 
(one professional judges, with maximum punishment of 5 years) or by summary procedure in 
the Sheriff’s (3 month maximum) or peace courts (the latter with lay justices and maximum 
punishment of 60 days). This situation would be “unthinkable” in England, Wales or the US 
where the defendant controls whether the trial be by jury or judge (or lay magistrate). Id. p. 
10.
46 Manipulative charging to infl uence the composition of the trial court is forbidden and may be 
nullifi ed by the court in several countries: CR (pp. 9-10); NO (p. 6); BU (p. 9); PO (p. 13); BR 
(p. 4); IT (p. 8). It is possible that it occurs in DE (pp. 22-23) and could avoid judicial control.
47 Such as in the US and Russia. Thaman, supra note 43.
48 Such is the case in Spain, where the right to jury trial may not be waived. Id. Jury trial may 
also not be waived in Denmark, P. Garde, The Danish Jury, 72 Rev. Int. de Droit Pénal (Lay 
Participation in the Criminal Trial in the XXIst Century), 87, 89 (2001).
49 Thaman, supra note 43, at 326.
50 See a discussion of the court trial system in the city of Philadelphia, in S. J. Schulhofer, Is 
Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1037, 1062-67 (1984).
51 Thaman, supra note 39, at 309. Damaska notes that the authorized use of coercion made it 
unnecessary for continental European offi cials to have to make concessions to defendants to 
get them to admit guilt, Damaska, supra note 4, at 1022. For the classic argument that plea 
bargaining replaced torture as the vehicle for coercing confessions of guilt, J. H. Langbein, 
Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3-22 (1978).
52 The 1877 Code of Criminal Procedure of Germany was introduced to put an end to inquisitorial 
procedure with its introduction of a public and oral trial before a jury, GE (p. 74). Inquisitorial 
procedure yielded in Denmark to adversarial procedure fi nally with reforms in 1919, DE (p. 
2).
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circumstantial evidence of guilt, whether it be through independent witness 
testimony, physical evidence, expert testimony, or even the simplifying of the 
oral trial.
 Systems in which a confessing defendant would achieve earlier release 
from pretrial detention53 or is promised or expects mitigation in charging54 or 
punishment55 upon confessing, can actually be viewed as systems of “plea-
bargaining,” even though those systems proclaim to be based on the legality 
principle, the search for material truth, and are openly hostile to American-
style plea-bargaining.56 Nowadays, the guilty plea and the confession should 
be treated in a procedurally similar fashion and there are some indications of a 
move in this direction. Although nearly all systems allow police to interrogate 
suspects even before the preliminary investigation has been initiated, some 
even allotting them a certain number of hours or days for this purpose,57 
most now recognize that a suspect should not be interrogated unless he or 
she has been advised of the right to counsel58 and the right to remain silent59 
53 In GE (p. 8), a detained suspect will be offered prospect of release from pretrial detention 
due to absence of detention ground of obstruction of justice due to a confession; NE (p. 7) notes 
that police do make promises of early release to induce confessions, but that this is technically 
illegal.
54 GE (p. 8), admits that confessions are bargained for in exchange for instituting diversion 
procedures, proceeding by way of penal order, requesting a mitigated punishment, etc.; DE (pp. 
11-13) recognizes that pretrial confession bargaining exists in exchange for limiting the charges, 
asking for less punishment, etc., but it is very controversial, with support among some voices 
in the literature, and opposition among others who fi nd it violates the principles of legality and 
material truth as well as the prohibition of coerced confessions.
55 In NO (p. 3), police may tell a suspect that the penal code permits a 1/3 reduction in sentence 
if a defendant has confessed; in BU (p. 4), while no bargaining is allowed for confessions, the 
police often induce them by indicating the possibility of a mitigated sentence. Any promise to 
release from detention or to mitigate the charges or punishment is illegal in: PO (p. 10); BR (p. 
2); IT (p. 4); CR (p. 5).
56 In Japan, penal orders exist for minor criminality, a simple non-adversary trial for defendants 
who confess (92% of all cases between 1987 and 1992) and an adversarial trial with more 
severe punishment when one is convicted. D. T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, in M. M. 
Feeley & S. Miyazawa (Eds.), The Japanese Adversary System in Context 142-45 (2002).
57 Three to six days in NE (p. 6). In some countries police create an interrogation space illegally 
by pretextually arresting a suspect for an administrative violation and then questioning about a 
suspected crime: BU (p. 3); see FR (§63 CCP).
58 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (l966); GE (p. 4); SA (p. 2); DE (p. 7); NE (p. 6); CR (p. 
4); BU (p. 4); NO (p. 2); PO (p. 10); BR (p. 1); IT (p. 2); SC (p. 3). In most countries, this of 
course includes the right to court-appointed counsel in the case of indigence or the fact a person 
is under pretrial arrest or detention. Miranda, supra; GE (p. 7); CR (p. 4); DE (p. 9); NO (p. 2); 
BU (p. 5); IT (p. 3). In NE (pp. 6-7), the admonitions of the right to appointed counsel are only 
given after the fi rst interrogation.
59 Miranda, supra note 58; GE (p. 7); DE (p. 8); NE (pp. 6-7); CR (p. 4); NO (p. 2); BU (p. 3); 
PO (p. 10); BR (p. 1); IT (p. 2); SC (p. 2).
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and waives those rights.60 Violations of these rules, called Miranda-rights 
in the US, will lead in some countries to inadmissibility of the statements 
subsequently obtained,61 in other countries not.62 The prohibition may be 
extended to evidence indirectly discovered through the interrogation as well,63 
such as evidence of crime, witnesses, or subsequent legal statements that 
come on the heels of inadmissible statements.64 The doctrine of “fruits of the 
poisonous tree,” however, is not recognized in some countries.65 Some systems 
allow waiver of the right before one has seen counsel,66 and others insist that 
the defendant consult with counsel before commencing the interrogation. 
Some systems will allow counsel to be present during the interrogation, but 
the defendant may waive this right.67 Others allow the defendant to waive 
counsel before having spoken with one or to waive the right of counsel to 
be present during questioning.68 Others do not allow counsel to be present 
unless the investigating offi cial grants permission69 or allow questioning if 
defense counsel does not appear after having been notifi ed.70 Finally, a few 
countries disallow use of any statement made by a defendant in the absence 
of counsel.71 An argument can be made for requiring counsel to be present 
during interrogation, just as counsel is required for all consensual procedures 
designed to elicit procedure-ending or procedure-simplifying admissions or 
stipulations.
60 See in general, S. C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 Saint Louis U. L. Rev. 581-
624 (2001).
61 DE (p. 8, where not advised of right to remain silent); NE (p. 7, as long as the suspicion 
in relation to the person questioned had crystallized enough for him to be a suspect rather 
than a “witness”.); CR (p. 5); BU (p. 4); BR (p. 1); IT (p. 2, extending inadmissibility to even 
spontaneous statements made in absence of counsel).
62 NO (p. 3); in Germany the statement is prima facie inadmissible, GE (p. 5), but if the 
seriousness of the crime outweighs the seriousness of the Miranda-violation, the evidence 
may be usable. Cf. Thaman, supra note 19, at 104-08; Thaman, supra note 60, at 606-08. In 
Scotland, a strict exclusionary rule has given way to a more fl exible “case-by-case” approach 
based in the discretion of the trial judge, SC (p. 3).
63 So-called “fruits of the poisonous tree” PO (p. 10); CR (p. 5).
64 GE (p. 6), will suppress a subsequent legal statement if suspect not advised that earlier 
statement was improperly obtained.
65 GE (p. 6), unless the violation is particularly egregious; DE (p. 9), allows use of contents 
of illegal interrogations to continue the investigation; NE (p. 7); NO (p. 3); BR (p. 2), within 
discretion of judge to admit. In Italy the doctrine of fruits of the poisonous tree is not recognized 
in relation to statements taken in violation of the admonition requirement. R. VanCleave, Italy, 
in C. M. Bradley (Ed.) Criminal Procedure. A Worldwide Study 264 (1999).
66 Miranda v. Arizona; BU (p. 5).
67 DE (p. 7); PO (p. 10); BR (p. 2).
68 DE (p. 7). 
69 NO (p. 2); GE (p. 4); NE (p. 6); SC (p. 3).
70 PO (p. 10).
71 IT (pp. 2-3); CR (p. 5); SA (pp. 2-3); RU (§75(2)(1) CCP).
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 This report will discuss procedures for skipping the preliminary 
investigation and a full-trial by use of pretrial diversion, victim-offender 
conciliation, penal orders, and consensual modes of stipulations of guilt, 
such as plea-bargaining. It will also discuss consensual means of simplifying 
trials through negotiations of confessions or trial-simplifying evidentiary 
concessions, up to the option of having a “trial on the fi le” with, if any, a 
minimum of oral testimony to complement it.
 I believe that the use of different procedures for different types of cases –
whether based on the seriousness of the threatened punishment, fl agrancy, the 
lack of controversy, etc. – should not necessarily mean that there will be more 
“truth” or more “justice” for those who are tried “with all the guarantees” 
than those who proceed to procedural resolution in swifter, less complicated 
ways.72
 In ancient times there was a diversity of procedures, ranging from 
compositions, to duels, ordeals, use of compurgators or juries or Schöffen 
depending on the particularities of the case.73 In the Middle Ages the old 
Germanic Schöffengericht continued to exist alongside the new inquisitorial 
procedures in the 16th Century German code, the Carolina.74 Written witness 
statements could be used in French correctional courts, staffed by professional 
judges, but not in its jury courts.75 
 Expedited, consensual and simplifi ed forms also existed in the ancient and 
pre-modern world. The precursor for expedited trials were the procedures 
for suspects caught “red-handed”76 or “hand-having”.77 In one Anglo-Saxon 
version of this procedure, the suspect gets “short shrift,” is not allowed to 
make a statement and is promptly “hanged, beheaded or precipitated from 
a cliff” perhaps even by the victim acting as executioner.78 Quite likely all 
systems of resolving confl icts that we would today characterize as “criminal” 
involved procedures which are analogous to the three main modes of 
criminal procedure today: accusatorial-adversarial procedures, inquisitorial-
72 Thaman, supra note 39, at 317.
73 J. H. Dawson, A History of Lay Judges 121 (1960).
74 G. Radbruch, Zur Einführung in die Carolina, in G. Radbruch (Ed.) Die Peinliche 
Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karls V. Von 1532 (1975), at 21.
75 See No. 242, Crim. 404, 405 (1884), a decision of the French Court of Cassation, with 
an English translation in Thaman, supra note 19, at 119-20. In fact, the French practice of 
correctionnalisation and English trial of either-way offenses in the magistrates’ courts are 
designed, often through anti-juridical manipulation of charging, to avoid trials in the jury 
(or assizes) courts. Id. at 141-44. See J. Pradel, Procédure Pénale 97-99 (9th ed. 1997), who 
emphasizes the “consensual” nature of this “illegal” but everyday practice.
76 On summary procedures for those caught “red-handed” in ancient England, see Th. A. Green, 
Verdict According to Conscience. Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 
(1985), at 8.
77 On the German Handhaftverfahren, see Th. Weigend, Deliktsopfer und Strafverfahren 36 
(1989).
78 Thaman, supra note 19, at 4.
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investigative procedures, and accusatorial-consensual procedures. Trials 
by battle, by lining up platoons of oath-helpers to swear at each other, by 
squaring off and heaping ridicule one on the other,79 were all precursors of 
the Anglo-American adversary trial with attorneys squaring off against each 
other and an independent trier of fact deciding the case. Trial by ordeal was a 
kind of Divine inquisition, much like as if the judges would have inquired the 
truth from oracles or from medicine men or soothsayers, and like the torture-
laden Medieval Inquisitionsprozess it involved infl icting severe pain on the 
suspect regardless of whether he or she were guilty or innocent. In Germanic 
and Anglo-Saxon traditions there were the self-informing grand juries and 
in Carolingian France the enquête du pais or the jury de dénonciation or the 
inquisitio generalis of the Canon law;80 fi nally, most early customary legal 
orders allowed for mediation and negotiation among accuser and accused 
(and their clans or families) and the payment of a composition or wergeld. If 
the family refused compensation or the culprit could not pay, then one of the 
other modes of trial would proceed with the possibility of severe, even capital 
punishment.81
 In this regard it is important to realize that no country has only an 
adversarial, inquisitorial or communitarian system of criminal justice. All 
systems have existed, and continue to exist in all countries in varying degrees 
as lateral or subsidiary traditions. Plea-bargaining à l’Américain is thus not 
only a result of the accusatorial-adversarial nature of the American trial ethic 
which allows the disponibilité of the charge, but also of more communitarian 
notions of compromise and restoring the judicial peace. More importantly it 
must be emphasized that plea-bargaining is just as much an offshoot of the 
Inquisitionsprozess with its stress on inducing admissions of guilt by using 
pressure, inducements, promises of leniency, if not outright torture. This will 
become increasingly evident when we discuss the inherent coercive nature of 
modern day American plea-bargaining.
 It also should be kept in mind that the offi cial paradigms of a system 
of criminal justice unceasingly trumpeted by its ideologues, the university 
79 It has been noted that such procedures existed, as well, in Croatia in the 10th through 12th 
Centuries, CR (p. 23). On the custom in Greenland of having the two sides compete by seeing 
who can sing the most ridiculous songs about the other, see U. Wesel, Frühformen des Rechts 
in Vorstaatlichen Gesellschaften 133-34 (1985).
80 A. Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure with Special Reference to France 
65-66 (1913). 
81 For an example from 10th Century England, see Thaman, supra note 19, at 8. Cf. Montesquieu, 
De L’Esprit des Lois, Vol. 1. (1748) 221 (GF-Flammarion 1979). On the rich buying their way 
out of corporal punishment with the consent of the victim, see Weigend, supra note 77 at 67-
69, and SC (p. 18). On the existence of “consensual” forms of resolving criminal-type disputes 
among the Nuer in Africa, where the wergeld took the form of payment in cows, in lieu of blood 
revenge, see Wesel, supra note 79, at 256-58 (1985). See also NO (p. 10), for a description of 
the transition from a family-based law based on revenge, to one based on compensation.
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professors, are not always the paradigms that dominate in the workaday world 
of the courts in the interactions of police, prosecutors, judges and defense 
lawyers. I have thus tried to get the country rapporteurs to assess the extent 
to which informal bargaining for confessions or for the application of certain 
alternative procedures exists in the corridors of courthouses if not in the 
offi cial codes. After all, American plea bargaining and the German practice of 
Absprachen, which is now used in a rising percentage of cases, were originally 
developed informally and only after many years were accepted by the courts 
if not actually codifi ed. I have also asked the country reporters to try to delve 
into their country’s past to see if there were early versions of consensual 
procedures that could be seen as the precursors of the modern variants.
2. Consensual Procedure Resulting in Dismissal with 
Conditions
2.1. Diversion
To lessen the burden on the criminal courts, many countries have instituted 
procedures similar to what is called “diversion” in the US,82 where a case, 
usually involving less serious crimes,83 is suspended for a period of time84 
82 Diversion was introduced in NO (p. 8) already in 1887 with the passage of its fi rst code of 
criminal procedure; in DE (p. 25) in 1932; in GE (p. 31), in 1974, with its scope being expanded 
in 1987 and 1993; in IT (p. 13) in 1988, with expansion to the peace courts in 2000; and in 1995 
in BR (p. 5) with its scope expanded in 2001. The composition pénale, a type of diversion, was 
introduced in France in 1999. Langer, supra note 13, at 59, see also, C. Saas, De la composition 
pénale au plaider-coupable: le pouvoir de sanction du procureur, Revue de Science Criminelle 
et de Droit Pénal Comparé 827-42 (2004). Both diversion and the use of “fi scal fi nes” were 
introduced in SC (pp. 10, 14) in 1988. Diversion applies to negligent or less serious crimes in 
NI (§63 CCP). Cf. LA (§70(1)(4) CCP).
83 GE (pp. 11, 29, misdemeanors, see §153a(1) CCP-Germany); in DE (pp. 17, 25) diversion is 
technically available in all crimes, but is usually applied to juvenile crimes punishable by fi ne 
only; NE (pp. 14-15, transactie applies to misdemeanors and minor felonies punishable by up to 
six years imprisonment); CR (pp. 2-3, applicable to crimes punishable by up to three years for 
adults and up to fi ve years for juveniles); in NO (p. 8) it is technically applicable to all crimes 
and has been twice used in homicide cases (euthanasia, father killing mentally ill child); BU (p. 
9, intentional crimes punishable by 3 years or less and reckless crimes punishable by 5 years 
or less); in France, the composition pénale may be applied in any case punishable by less than 
5 years, Saas, supra note 82, at 832; PO (p. 15, crimes punishable by up to 3 years); BR (p. 5, 
crimes with minimum punishment of one year deprivation of liberty); IT (p. 11, juvenile cases 
and cases before the justice of the peace, since the year 2000); SC (p. 11, “fi scal fi nes” apply to 
all cases tried in the district courts, thus punishable by less than 60 days deprivation of liberty). 
Diversion applies to negligent or less serious crimes in NI (§63 CCP) and LA (§415(3)(1) CCP) 
and to slight or midlevel crimes which are not of signifi cant danger to the community in MO 
(§510 CCP).
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and certain conditions are imposed on the defendant, which, if fulfi lled will 
result in a dismissal of the case and the absence of any conviction. Typical 
conditions are restitution,85 payment of money to a public institution86 or a 
fi ne,87 community service work,88 drug or alcohol treatment,89 making support 
payments,90 etc.91 Abstention from further criminal conduct is of course always 
a condition.92 Naturally, the defendant must agree to fulfi l the conditions and 
this opens a space for bargaining between prosecution and defense both as 
to the appropriateness of the diversion and the time and conditions it will be 
subject to.93 In some countries, limitations are placed on which cases shall 
be subject to diversion, such as the lack of public interest in pursuing the 
crime94 or the borderline question of guilt,95 or even, on the contrary, that the 
defendant confess his guilt.96
 Diversion and the resulting dismissal has been criticized because in some 
countries the alleged victim has no control over the decision not to pursue 
a conviction.97 Furthermore, the institution has been considered to amount 
84 Case suspended for: no more than 3 years in IT (p. 12); two years in BR (p. 5); one year 
in MO (§511(1) CCP); six months in France, Saas, supra note 82, at 829. In NI (§64 (para.2) 
CCP), suspension is for no less than two months and no more than three years.
85 NE (pp. 14-15); NO (p. 8); BU (p. 9); BR (p. 5); GE (p. 29); DE (p. 25); CR (pp. 2, 14); PO 
(p. 18); IT (p. 12); NI (§63(para.2) CCP); MO (§510(2)(5) CCP); ES (§202(1) CCP); France, 
Saas, supra note 82, at 829.
86 GE (p. 29); CR (pp. 2, 14).
87 NE (pp. 14-15, of up to 350 Euros); BU (p. 9, of from 250 to 500 US dollars); DE (p. 25); 
France, Saas, supra note 82, at 830; in SC (pp. 11-12, the “fi scal fi nes,” were originally limited 
to 25 pounds, though may now reach 100 pounds and reform proposals would raise them even 
further). 
88 NE (pp. 14-15); GE (p. 29); CR (pp. 2,14); NI (§65(4) CCP). In France, no more than 60 
hours of community service work to be completed within 6 months (830) Saas, supra note 82, 
at 830.
89 NE (pp. 14-15); DE (p. 25); CR (pp. 2,14); NI (§65(9) CCP).
90 CR (pp. 2, 14).
91 Under the Soviet era Russian CCP, cases involving minor misdemeanors were dismissed and 
referred to “comrade’s courts” for informal administrative resolution. RSFSR (§51 CCP).
92 Such as in Danish “youth contracts,” DE (pp. 26-27); BR (p. 5); MO (§511(1)(3) CCP).
93 GE (p. 30); PO (p. 15); in BR (p. 5) there is sometimes informal bargaining about the amount 
of restitution; although bargaining is not allowed or done in, NE (p. 14); CR (p. 15); BU (p. 
10); IT (p. 12); SC (p. 14); in the Netherlands prosecutors sometimes have to bargain with white 
collar defendants who have powerful lawyers representing them, NE (p. 15). On the “room for 
bargaining” in relation to French compositions pénales, see Langer, supra note 13, at 59.
94 CR (pp. 2, 13); expressed in PO (p. 15) as minor dangerousness of the act. 
95 GE (p. 29).
96 In Denmark, defendant must confess unconditionally and confession must be corroborated, 
DE (pp. 17, 25-26); PO (p. 15), requires that guilt be clear and that the defendant will not 
recidivate; confessions of guilt are required in NI (§63 CCP), PAR (§21 CCP), MO (§510(1) 
CCP) and in France, Langer, supra note 13, at 59.
97 GE (p. 31); DE (p. 27); NE (p. 14); NO (p. 8); BU (p. 9); IT (p. 12), France, Saas, supra note 
82, at 840. The victim does have a veto right in CR (p. 14).
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to a kind of Verdachtsstrafe in that sanctions are imposed without a fi nding 
of guilt98 and by a prosecutor and not a judge.99 Undue pressure is put on 
the defendant to accept the conditions, thus tending to violate the prohibition 
against coercing admissions of guilt.100 It has been contended that the procedure 
violates the principle of a public trial, allowing rich defendants to secretly buy 
there way out of criminal liability and avoid prejudicial limelight,101 or that the 
bureaucratic-administrative procedure results in a de facto decriminalization 
eliminating blameworthiness in favor or payment of a “tax” on erstwhile 
illegal activity.102 Nonetheless, a relatively large amount of cases are resolved 
using diversion procedures in some countries which has helped to unburden 
the courts.103
2.2.  Victim-Offender Conciliation
The movement for restorative justice has been instrumental in the increasing 
popularity of expanding procedures of victim-offender conciliation as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution.104 The roots of this procedure can be found 
98 In GE (p. 11), a dismissal per §153 StPO leads to a “hypothetical evaluation of guilt” whereas 
§153a StPO requires determination of slight to middle-level guilt due to the imposition of 
sanctions. It has been criticized as the imposition of punishment, in the form of “conditions” 
based on mere suspicion, and because there is no judicial involvement, thus hearkening back 
to inquisitorial procedures where the investigative offi cial also decided the case and sentenced, 
GE (p. 31). The ECHR has also made this criticism in Oztürk v. Germany (2.21.84), NE (pp. 
14-15). The French injonction pénale was introduced by a law of December 22, 1994 but was 
declared unconstitutional by the Conseil constitutionnel on February 2, 1995, on the basis that 
the prosecution was essentially issuing a judgment, confusing the roles of prosecution and 
judgment. Pradel, supra note 75, at 204.
99 As to France, see Saas, supra note 82, at 827. Even police suspend proceedings in minor 
traffi c cases and impose sanctions. Id., at 829.
100 GE (p. 31).
101 GE (p. 31); NE (pp. 16-17, for this reason NE is moving towards replacing diversion with 
penal orders).
102 SC (p. 22).
103 15-20% of all cases in the last 20 years, GE (p. 30); 7-11% of all dismissals from 1995-2002 
in DE (p. 25); used 219 times in 2001 in NO (p. 8); in CR (p. 15), the procedure was seldom 
used in relation to adults, but resulted in anywhere from 59% (young adults from 18-21 years 
of age) to 87% (juveniles from 15-18 years of age) of all dismissals. In Scotland, informal 
diversion was used in 3.1% of cases in 2002-03, 3.9% in 2004-2005, and “fi scal fi nes,” another 
type of diversion, were used in 7.9% of cases in 2002-03, 9.3% in 2003-04, SC (p. 4). On the 
other hand, the procedure is seldom used in CR (p. 16) or France, where only .17% of cases 
were resolved by diversion in 2001. Langer, supra note 13, at 61.
104 The procedure exists since 1930 in IT (p. 14), but only in 1999 were provisions made to 
assess the costs of the procedure to the defendant. It was introduced in NO (p. 9), in 1991, in 
1994 in GE (p. 32), but procedural mechanisms to implement it were not introduced until 1999 
which seek to encourage victim-offender mediation in as many cases as possible, GE (p. 35); in 
DE (p. 27) in 1995 experimentally in three jurisdictions; in BR (pp. 1, 4-6) in 1995. In SC (p. 
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in ancient customary law where the families or clans of victims and victimizers 
would arrange for a composition, wergeld or some kind of compensation, 
often accompanied by feasts or other rituals of conciliation.105 
 Today the procedure is often obligatory as a fi rst step in cases brought 
by private complaint and private prosecution, usually misdemeanor offenses 
such as battery, infl iction of minor injuries, defamation, vandalism, etc.106 
The procedure is popular in many of the former Soviet republics,107 where 
some codes even articulate the “right” of the defendant to conciliate with 
the victim.108 Only if the case cannot be settled through conciliation will the 
criminal procedure continue along the normal path. The result is a dismissal 
once conciliation has been achieved.109 Since many of these minor crimes 
may be subject to diversion proceedings there may be an intertwining of 
these procedures.110 It has been limited to minor offenses,111 generally, due 
to the possibility that infl uential or perhaps dangerous defendants could 
coerce conciliation for robberies or rapes, etc., and thus avoid criminal 
responsibility.112 Some voices in the literature, a distinct minority, maintain 
that the procedure might violate equal protection if not applied to crimes 
where society is the victim.113
14), charity-administered conciliation programs were introduced on an experimental basis in 
Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Lanarkshire in 1988.
105 Damaska, supra note 4, at 1020, believes the early medieval legal process constituted “the 
common stem of Western procedural culture” and a “vehicle for the settlement of disputes and 
the prevention of endemic violence.”
106 GE (p. 15); NE (p. 27); CR (p. 16); NO (p. 8); BU (pp. 5-6, 10); PO (pp. 3-4, 19); IT (p. 13, 
entire system of peace courts is aimed at promoting conciliation). In Nicaragua, “mediation” 
towards the end of conciliation and restitution is possible in cases of misdemeanors, negligent 
or unintentional crimes, property crimes among family members involving violence or 
intimidation, and crimes punishable with minor punishments, NI (§56 CCP). In Paraguay, 
conciliation is obligatory in cases subject to private prosecution, and discretionary in others. 
PAR (§§311, 424 CCP). In UZ (§84(para.5)(2)), the procedure is limited to fi rst-offenders who 
do not represent “great social danger” or perpetrators of less serious crimes who have made 
restitution, showed active remorse, or helped solve the crime.
107 It was included in the Soviet era Russian RSFSR (§5(6) CCP) relating to cases initiated by 
complaint of the victim and was further included in the MPCCIS (§36(1)(6)) and in AR (§36 
CCP); BE (§§26(2), 29(1)(5), 30(1)(2) CCP); LA (§§536-38 CCP); LI (§§207, 420 CCP); TA 
(§§5(para.1)(3), 5.3 CCP); UZ (§§582-86 CCP).
108 LA (§66(1)(17) CCP).
109 UZ (§84(para.4) CCP); TU (§31(1)(6) CCP-Draft).
110 GE (pp. 17, 36-38); in Nicaragua, “mediation” leads to a suspension of the case pending 
restitution and other conditions, much as is the case with diversion, NI (§57(4) CCP).
111 In Russia it may be applied to crimes of slight or mid-level gravity. RU (§25 CCP) in the 
MPCCIS (§37(1)) to misdemeanors.
112 This has been a problem in Venezuela, but not recognized as a problem in CR (p. 17), NO (p. 
9), BR (p. 6), SC (p. 14), or IT (p. 13), though in the latter it could not be excluded.
113 GE (pp. 32-33, such as the offenses of complete intoxication, tax fraud, etc.). 
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 Victim-Offender conciliation requires active participation of both parties 
and should not be confused with procedures which, upon the payment of 
restitution, may result in dismissal, without there necessarily being a face-to-
face interaction.114 Thus, a type of bargaining is compelled at times in these 
cases,115 in fact is part and parcel of the conciliation process, in determining 
the plausibility of conciliation and the terms which will ensure its success.116 
Bargaining as to restitution even in cases without a private victim, such as 
tax cases, is a commonplace as well.117 In some countries, neutral mediators 
are used118 and the public prosecutor is not involved.119 In others the public 
prosecutor120 or the court are involved.121 In Russia, it has been held that the 
court must entertain a motion to dismiss on the part of the aggrieved party 
where complete restitution has been made and the defendant has little or no 
criminal record and has expressed remorse.122
 As with diversion and penal orders, some voices fi nd that victim-offender 
conciliation provisions, when they are conditioned on the defendant admitting 
guilt,123 violate the privilege against self-incrimination by compelling this 
admission.124 The frequency of use of victim-offender mediation varies from 
country to country.125 
114 BR (p. 5); GE (p. 32). Provisions allowing dismissal or mitigation to be triggered by 
restitution may be applicable to more serious offenses, like sexual offenses, whereas victim-
offender conciliation would not, GE (p. 34).
115 GE (p. 36).
116 In CR (p. 16), where conciliation not regulated, bargaining is well possible; in BR (p. 6), IT 
(p. 13), there is bargaining as to the amount of restitution.
117 In GE (pp. 35-37), it has been questioned whether restitution should suffi ce to trigger a 
dismissal in cases involving the rich because no “considerable personal efforts.” or “personal 
sacrifi ce” is involved. Some voices claim that such defendants should also make a large 
symbolic payment to the state coffers.
118 PO (pp. 4, 18, requires parties select a person or institution in whom they have confi dence); DE 
(p. 28); in Nicaragua, “mediation” may be conducted before a lawyer, notary, public defender or 
a rural “facilitator of justice,” NI (§57 (para.1) CCP). The Paraguayan code mentions the use of 
an amigable componedor (“friendly compromiser”), PAR (§424 CCP). For the use of mediators 
in the probation offi ce, see LA (§381 CCP).
119 DE (p. 28).
120 In NE (p. 19), while there is no offi cial victim-offender conciliation, a procedure was 
experimentally introduced in 1995 allowing the victim to approach the public prosecutor before 
joining trial as an aggrieved party with a claim to compensation and to attempt, with help of the 
prosecutorial staff, to come to an agreement with the offender about compensation. Principle 
of opportunity then allows prosecutor to base decision on whether or not to prosecute on the 
outcome.
121 BU (p. 10).
122 Opredelenie Sudebnoy kollegii po ugolovnym delam Verkhovnogo Suda RF, May 24, 2005, 
No. 57-D05-9 http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=4365.
123 GE (p. 35, requires a confession in cases involving violence and sexual assault); DE (p. 28); 
PO (p. 18); NO (p. 8, guilt must have been proved for the procedure to be used).
124 GE (pp. 34-35).
125 It was little used in the early years in GE, but this is beginning to change GE (p. 37), and has 
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3. Consensual Procedures Resulting in a Skipping of the 
Preliminary Investigation and the Trial
3.1. Penal Orders
The penal order, which appears to have originated in Germany,126 consists 
in the public prosecutor, in cases in which only a fi ne127or lesser periods of 
deprivation of liberty128 is contemplated, submitting in writing a suggested 
charge and punishment to the defendant, who is given a short period of time 
to accept or reject the proposal.129 If the defendant rejects the proposal, the 
case will be tried according to the normal procedures.130 In many countries, 
the defendant’s silence or failure to respond will constitute acceptance of the 
also been used only 8,000 times in PO (p. 19) in the fi rst eight years of its existence, 60% of 
cases actually resulting in conciliation; in DE (p. 27), conciliation was requested in 1432 cases, 
357 were referred to a mediator, and 150 were successfully mediated; in NO (p. 9) it was used 
only 20 times in 2004. In BR (p. 9) victim-offender conciliation has unburdened the courts to 
a certain extent, but has been seen as being relatively ineffective. In 2004-05 in SC (p. 14), 
victim-offender conciliation was undertaken in 1,232 cases and was successful in 91% of cases 
in which both victim and defendant.
126 The institution goes back to 1877 and is based on a previous Prussian model, GE (p. 28).
127 GE (pp. 22-23, cases punishable by fi nes or suspended periods of imprisonment of up to one 
year); DE (pp. 19, 24, fi nes only); LI (§425(1) CCP) (fi ne only); NE (p. 17, if the fi ne exceeds 
2000 Euros, the prosecutor must hear the defendant, but fi nes not surpassing 225 Euros, and 
suspensions of a driver’s license for up to six months may be ordered without a hearing); IT 
(p. 10, crimes punishable by a fi ne or up to 6 months suspended imprisonment); the offense 
itself may be punishable by deprivation of liberty, NE (p. 17, of up to six years); CR (p. 11, of 
up to fi ve years) as long as only a fi ne is sought in relation to the defendant in question (NO, 
p. 7, applicable to burglary and theft in such circumstances); BR (pp. 4-5), misdemeanors or 
offenses punishable by less than two years); SC (pp. 12-13, “fi xed penalties” of up to 60 pounds 
for normal traffi c offenses, and 200 pounds for driving without insurance may be issued by 
the public prosecutor or the police). See also ES (§251(1) CCP); LI (§425(1) CCP); CH (§392 
CCP) (procedimiento monitorio), C. Riego, El procedimiento abreviado en Chile, in Maier & 
Bovino, supra note 38, at 472. The French “simplifi ed procedure,” which results in a penal 
order (ordonnance pénale) is applicable to minor crimes (délits) and infractions (contraventions) 
where no imprisonment is possible, FR (§§495, 459-1, 524 CCP).
128 In PO (p. 16), “conviction without trial” may apply to offenses punishable by up to 10 
years.
129 Seven days in LI (§§427, 429 CCP); Eight days in CR (p. 11); three to ten days in NO (p. 7); 
10 days in ES (§254(6) CCP); two weeks in GE (p. 24), NE (p. 17), 15 days in IT (p. 10) and 
immediately upon oral offer at the preliminary hearing in BR (p. 5); up to 28 days, however, 
with regard to Scottish “fi xed penalties.” SC (p. 12); 15 days per CH (§392(c) CCP), Riego, 
supra note 127, at 472. The defendant in cases of French “simplifi ed procedure,” however, has 
45 days to accept the penal order, in cases of délits, FR (495-3 CCP), and 30 days in cases of 
contraventions, FR (§527 CCP).
130 DE (pp. 12, 24).
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penal order.131 The judge in most countries, however, maintains the power to 
reject the penal order if he/she believes it is unsupported by the evidence.132 
Sometimes the victim also may block a penal order.133 Sometimes, the penal 
order is restricted to cases where the defendant has confessed or where 
the state of the evidence clearly shows guilt, as would be the case with 
fl agrant offenses.134 Penal orders result, at times, in a statutorily discounted 
punishment.135 Although not provided for in the code, it has been recognized 
that bargaining between defense and prosecution at the early stages of the 
procedure exists,136 or cannot be excluded as a possibility137 so that a penal 
order will be satisfactory to the defense. While the court pronounces judgment 
tantamount to a guilt-fi nding in many countries,138 it is of a skeletal variety 
due to the lack of a formal investigation of the evidence.139 In some countries, 
however, the fi nding is less one of guilt, than a kind of Verdachtsstrafe, i.e., a 
mere fi nding of probable cause.140
 Penal orders have greatly reduced the caseload of the courts in some 
countries,141 yet continue to arouse criticism due to the fact that the defendant 
usually has no right to be heard142 and that it is essentially the prosecutor 
131 FR (§527(para.4) CCP).
132 GE (pp. 23-24, if no “probable cause” or disagrees with the punishment proposed, in which 
cases proceeds by the expedited procedure); CR (p. 11); ES (§253(3) CCP); the judge has no 
power to reject the penal order, however, in: NO (p. 7); LI (§427 CCP).
133 IT (p. 10); FR (§§524(para.3), 528-2(para.3) CCP, if victim has fi led a complaint against the 
defendant).
134 GE (p. 23); DE (pp. 19, 24, often applicable to petty thefts, minor drug offenses, traffi c 
cases). See also the CCP-Neuquen (Argentina) where the preliminary investigation may be 
eliminated in fl agrant cases. G. Vitale, El proceso penal abreviado con especial referencia a 
Neuquén, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 366.
135 Up to 1/2 of what would have been the appropriate fi ne, IT (p. 10). 
136 GE (p. 26). For instance, the prosecutor may suggest a particular level of fi ne to the defendant 
if the defendant agrees not to object to the penal order. M. D. Dubber, American Plea Bargains, 
German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stanford L. Rev. 547, 560 
(1997).
137 DE (p. 24); NE (p. 19, no reason to believe prosecutor won’t bargain with powerful 
defendants); NO (p. 7); IT (pp. 10-11).
138 In IT (p. 11); GE (p. 26); SC (pp. 12-13), the decree is equal to a judgment and may not be 
appealed.
139 In CR (pp. 11, 21), it is based on the police report and the court’s satisfaction that the fi ne or 
measure is correctly imposed.
140 Some voices in Germany belief the fi nding is really only one of probable cause, GE (p. 26); 
BR (p. 5), treats the result as a mere imposition of punishment without a guilt-fi nding.
141 Penal orders constitute 2/3 of all convictions in GE (p. 26). In the mid 1990’s, around 22% of 
penal orders were rejected by defendants. Dubber, supra note 136, at 562. 28% of all cases in 
Croatia are resolved by penal orders, CR (p. 12); in 2001 NO (p. 7) decided 215,276 cases by 
penal order. On the other hand, “fi xed penalty” cases amount to only 2-3% of all cases in SC (p. 
13). Few defendants reject the penal order in France. Pradel, supra note 75, at 683.
142 Thus violating right of due process of Arts. 14(1)(1) IPCPR, 6(1)(1) ECHR and 103 Const. 
Ger. GE (p. 27). 
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that imposes judgment143 without trial144 and with minimal or no judicial 
control and no express fi nding of guilt.145 Fears have been expressed that 
a defendant, who might not be represented by counsel, will agree without 
suffi cient knowledge of the circumstances.146 Concerns of equal protection 
due to differences in the treatment of like offenses in different judicial districts 
have also been voiced.147 Concerns of procedural economy, however, have 
also led to praise of the penal order due to its unburdening of the courts and 
the fact the defendant has a right to reject the offer.148 Despite its 100 year plus 
vintage, many countries are only recently turning to the penal order in pursuit 
of procedural economy.149
3.2. Guilty Pleas and Stipulations to the Charges as Substitutes for the 
Criminal Trial
3.2.1. Introduction: the Common Law Guilty Plea and its Development in 
the US
It is unclear when in the Anglo-American Common Law a guilty plea by a 
defendant led inexorably to the waiver of the right to have a jury decide the 
issue of guilt or innocence.150 The procedure likely had its roots in the 19th 
Century but, once it was accepted that a guilty plea could lead directly to 
sentence, the procedure gradually began to replace the full-blown trial by 
jury.151 By the beginning of the 20th Century, 50% of all cases were settled by 
guilty pleas in the US, the percentage rising to 80% in the 1960’s and reaching 
93-95% today.152 While guilty pleas were accepted in the 19th Century as a trial-
ending procedural fi gure, it was only in the mid-20th Century that it began to 
143 Thus violating the separation of powers, DE (p. 24); NE (pp. 18-19); PO (p. 16).
144 GE (p. 27).
145 GE (pp. 27-28, due to overburdening of courts).
146 NE (p. 19).
147 DE (p. 25).
148 DE (p. 24); CR (pp. 12, 22); NO (p. 7); IT (p. 11).
149 NE (p. 17), has only introduced it in 2006 in order to be able to more expeditiously exact fi nes 
where terms of diversion have been violated; IT (p. 22) introduced the penal order with its 1988 
Code of Criminal Procedure and CR (p. 12) in 1998.
150 When trials in England were fast and one jury could handle several in one day, trial judges 
discouraged defendants from pleading guilty and encouraged them to take their chance with the 
jury. J. H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 19 (2003). Guilty pleas were also 
discouraged in late 18th Century America, and one trial court, as late as the 1890’s could still 
handle as many as six trials a day. A. W. Alschuler & A. G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal 
Jury in the United States, 6l U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 922-25 (1994).
151 In SC (p. 15) there is no further taking of evidence after a guilty plea and the proceedings 
immediately move to the sentencing stage.
152 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 150, at 922-24.
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be recognized that guilty pleas were often preceded by full-fl edged bargaining 
by prosecutor, defendant, and sometimes the judge over the type of charge the 
defendant would admit to and the parameters of the resultant punishment. The 
US Supreme Court fi nally recognized the fact of such bargaining and even 
put its stamp of approval on it, claiming it did not violate any of the important 
principles of criminal procedure as long as the defendant made a knowing and 
voluntary plea and properly waived his right to remain silent, to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses, and his right to a trial by jury. The “knowledge” 
requirement was held to mean that he must know the character of the charges 
and that he must know the consequences of his plea as well, i.e., the range of 
possible punishment, and sometimes even collateral measures that might be 
applied upon the fi nding of guilt.153
 Eventually, plea-bargaining and guilty pleas were regulated by sometimes 
detailed statutes154 which cover the procedure for obtaining pleas, the rights of 
the defendant, such as the right to counsel, which must be abided by, as well 
as the types of rights a defendant can be induced to waive upon entering into a 
“plea agreement,” as the resulting contract has been named in the US federal 
system. All terms must be put on the record now in most US jurisdictions.155
 What is common in all US jurisdictions, is that plea-bargaining applies 
to any and all kinds of cases, from minor infractions, up to capital murder 
cases. This differentiates American plea-bargaining from most other systems 
which have been adopted in other countries. Another important factor, is 
that the large differences between minimum and maximum punishments in 
most US jurisdictions means that the “offer” of the public prosecutor may 
appear to some to be inherently coercive.156 The US Supreme Court has ruled 
that it does not, for instance, violate due process for a prosecutor to offer 
a defendant to either admit guilt and suffer a fi ve year sentence, or insist 
on a jury trial, where, if he is convicted, the public prosecutor will ask for 
life imprisonment.157 Critics have claimed that only with a reduction in the 
Draconian length of prison sentences will plea-bargaining’s hold on criminal 
procedure be loosened.158 
153 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 242-44 (l969); United States v. Brady, 397 US 742, 751-52 
(1970); Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257, 261 (1971).
154 Informal guilty plea practice became codifi ed in SA (p. 6), only in 2001.
155 US (p. 2). The same holds true in SA (p. 7). The main federal statute is Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
156 Many critics point to the huge differences between punishments in America and Europe to 
stress this aspect of American plea bargaining. Damaska, supra note 4, at 1027. Hans Zeisel 
once surmised that each month of a European sentence would translate into a year’s deprivation 
of liberty in the US. Langbein, supra note 51, at 16. Dubber, supra note 136, at 596-97, has 
noted that, while all defendants convicted of felonies in the US federal courts receive prison 
sentences (40% of which were suspended as a condition of probation), no federal felon received 
a fi ne as the primary sentence, whereas in Germany 80% of all punishments are fi nes, and only 
5% are sentenced to deprivation of liberty.
157 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (l978).
158 Dubber, supra note 136, at 553, 597.
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3.2.2. The Gradual but Reluctant Acceptance of Guilty-Plea Mechanisms in 
Civil Law Jurisdictions
Historically in the countries of the civil law, a defendant could not herself 
dispose of the charges by admitting guilt, thus preventing further taking of 
evidence and the conduct of a trial, whether it be before jury, mixed court or a 
panel of judges or a single magistrate. This violated the right to due process, 
the requirement that justice could only be meted out by a judge, and many 
important principles of continental European criminal procedure. This view 
still holds in many countries.159 
 Nevertheless, already in 19th Century Spain, a defendant was allowed to 
terminate the taking of evidence and cause the trial to move to the imposition 
of punishment by expressing his conformity, or conformidad to the pleadings 
of the prosecution parties.160 This tradition has continued in an uninterrupted 
fashion up to this day and has served as a model for some Latin American 
countries in the development of guilty-plea mechanisms.161
 Otherwise, the fi rst apparent break in the complete rejection of guilty plea 
mechanisms came with the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 with the 
introduction of the “application for punishment upon request of the parties,” 
commonly called the patteggiamento, or “deal” which originally provided for 
up to a 1/3 discount on punishment and was limited to crimes punishable 
by no more than three years deprivation of liberty. The patteggiamento has 
become one of the main models for guilty plea mechanisms which have 
been introduced in Europe,162 the former Soviet Republics163 and some Latin 
American countries. 
159 GE (p. 38); DE (p. 17); NO (p. 9).
160 Since the enactment of the CCP of 1882, SP (p. 2). See N. Rodríguez García, El Consenso en 
el Proceso Penal Espanol 78 (1997), who claims the procedure was already introduced as early 
as 1848.
161 The Spanish conformidad was the model for the juicio abreviado provided for in §431 bis 
of the Argentine Federal CPP, A. Bovino, Procedimiento abreviado y juicio por jurados, in 
Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 65-66. It was introduced in 1997 in the Federal Argentine 
CCP, Córdoba, supra note 38, at 229. It was introduced in 1994 in the CCP of the Province of 
Tierra del Fuego and called the omisión del debate (omission of the trial). E. C. Sarrabayrouse, 
La omisión del debate en el Código Procesal Penal de Tierra del Fuego. Su régimen legal y 
aplicación práctica, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 300-02. It is also clearly the model 
for many of the “abbreviated procedures” introduced in other parts of Latin America: the 
procedimientos abreviados in the 1999 CCP of Bolivia, BO (§373 CCP); the 2000 CCP of 
Chile, CH (§406 CCP). Among the successor states of the Soviet Union, the possibility of 
entering a “guilty plea” was broached in §35 of the Model Code of Criminal Procedure for the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (MCCIS).
162 Consensual procedures similar to the Italian model have been introduced in: SA (p. 8) in 
2000; in BU (p. 12) in 2000, with signifi cant changes made in 2005; in CR (p. 22) in 2002.
163 This rapporteur drafted a chapter on consensual procedures for the authors of the 2001 
Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and the legislator adopted a procedure I suggested which 
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 Finally, a more wide-open negotiation of guilty pleas has been adopted in 
some countries based on the classic American model and often as the result of 
American infl uence in the legislative process in those countries.164
3.2.3. Theories for Accepting “Bargaining” With Justice
In the US, plea-bargaining has been justifi ed on the theory that it is a “contract” 
between two equal bargaining entities that must be upheld. If the prosecutor 
reneges on the offer, the defendant can withdraw his plea or plead for specifi c 
enforcement of the terms.165 If the defendant breaches, he may be prosecuted 
on the dismissed charges, held to his guilty plea, and be sentenced to a more 
aggravated punishment.166 Easterbrook invokes models of contract law, and 
characterizes plea bargaining as a “voluntary transaction which maximizes 
the welfare of both parties.” The defendant is spared of anxiety and the costs 
of litigation and the prosecutor frees up resources to pursue other criminals. 
He argues against judicial oversight for “if a third party must approve the 
settlement, settlements and their savings become less frequent.167
 It is seen to be an outgrowth of the adversarial system of justice168 where 
the search for truth is not an explicit goal of the proceedings169 and trial judges 
have no prior knowledge of the facts of the case to guide any search for truth 
due to the absence of an investigative fi le.170
was very similar to the Italian patteggiamento. See Rekomendatsii parlamentskikh slushaniy 
“O khode podgotovki proekta Ugolovno-protsessual’nogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii” 
(po problemam, kasaiushchikhsia sokrashchennykh predvaritel’nykh slushaniy i form 
sudoproizvodstva). 16 January 2001 (copy on fi le with author). 
164 See the procedures for Nicaragua and Venezuela, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and 
Georgia, addressed infra.
165 Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257, 261 (1971). The government may be in breach of the 
contract if it breaks its promise not to oppose the defendant’s request for a certain punishment 
by attempting to prove aggravating circumstances, United States v. Taylor, 77 F3d 368 (11th Cir. 
1996), or, for instance, by submitting a victim impact statement, United States v. Johnson, 187 
F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 1999), US (p. 5). For a position in support of the contract theory, see F. H. 
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L. J. 1969, 1975 (1992).
166 United States v. Holbrook, 368 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 
124 (2d Cir. 2004), US (p. 5).
167 US (p. 7).
168 Langer, supra note 13, at 6, sees plea bargaining as a ‘text’ that has been translated from one 
‘language’ – the adversarial system of the United States, into another, that of the inquisitorial 
systems of Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France.
169 “The adversarial conception of truth is more relative and consensual: if the parties come to an 
agreement as to the facts of the case, through plea agreements or stipulations, it is less important 
to determine how events actually occurred.” Langer, supra note 13, at 10.
170 US (p. 1).
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3.2.4. The Scope of the Application of Guilty Plea Mechanisms
A guilty plea may be accepted in relation to any charge, even the most serious, 
in the US and will serve to terminate evidence-taking and move the case 
immediately to the sentencing stage and the imposition of punishment.171 This 
model has been followed in some countries.172
 The consensual procedures in the civil law realm have typically not been 
applicable to prosecutions for serious or especially grave offenses.173 The 
Spanish conformidad is applicable, in its usual form, to crimes punishable 
by no more than six years deprivation of liberty.174 In some Latin American 
171 This should be distinguished from countries where the defendant may admit guilt, thus 
shortening the trial, or even providing for a trial before a professional bench, rather than a bench 
with lay participation, NO (pp. 4, 9).
172 In SC (p. 15) and apparently in SA (p. 6). It also appears there is no restriction in the BO (§373 
CCP). In Costa Rica, a conformidad-type acceptance of the charge with a substantial reduction 
in punishment potentially applies to all charges. J. Llobet Rodríguez, Procedimiento abreviado 
en Costa Rica, presunción de inocencia y derecho de abstención de declarar, in Maier & 
Bovino, supra note 38, at 446. In Honduras, the “abbreviated procedure” applies to all crimes, 
as long as the accused has no prior criminal record. HO (§403 CCP). The Nicaraguan acuerdo 
(agreement) appears to be very close to the US plea bargain, as it allows free negotiation of the 
charges in all types of cases, NI (§61(para.1) CCP). In Venezuela, the “procedure for admitting 
the facts” is applicable to all cases, though the discount one receives differs depending on the 
seriousness of the offense, see infra, VE (§376 CCP). There appear to be no limits to the plea-
bargaining introduced in 2004 in Georgia and in the Latvian “agreements” in §§539-43 of the 
2005 CCP.
173 Only misdemeanors in PO (p. 16); they may not apply to fi rst degree offenses punishable 
by a minimum of 4 years or maximum of life imprisonment in Estonia. §239 CCP-Estonia. 
The Moldovan guilty plea may be accepted in relation to crimes of slight, mid-level or serious 
character. MO (§504(2) CCP). This appears to exclude “especially serious” crimes.
174 SP (p. 1). The same six year limit exists in the juicio abreviado in Argentina’s federal CCP, 
Bovino, supra, note 161, at 65. In a 2002 Spanish law which introduced “expedited trials,” 
however, a defendant may express his/her conformidad in any case where the public prosecutor 
is requesting a sentence of ten years or less, although the amount of actual prison time is 
limited to two years in such cases, SP (p. 8); conformidad is also applicable in juvenile cases, 
where usually only measures short of deprivation of liberty are imposed, SP (p. 12). Despite 
these statutory limitations, it seems as if Spanish courts will accept “guilty pleas” to more 
serious crimes and move directly to sentence, as was recently done in the case of the “rapist of 
Pozuelo” in the Madrid Provincial Court where a Brazilian “pled guilty” and accepted a 300 
year sentence (he will only serve 20 years thereof). El ‘violador de Pozuelo’ acepta una pena 
de más de 300 anos de prisión por atacar a 19 mujeres, El País, June 6, 2006, at 40. Similar 
procedures in Cuba are applicable to crimes punishable by up to seven years, C. Loarca & M. 
Bertelotti, El procedimiento abreviado en Guatemala, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 
413. The conformidad-type procedures in the CCP of Buenos Aires, however, applies to crimes 
punishable by up to eight years, and that of the CCP of the Province of Córdoba in Argentina 
applies to all crimes. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 249. The Model CCP for Ibero-America 
originally called for limiting such procedures to crimes punishable by no more than two years, 
Id., and the CCP-Tierra del Fuego permits them for crimes punishable by a maximum of three 
years. Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 302.
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jurisdictions, the parties may agree to a disposition as to the facts and the 
sentence in minor cases and the judge may not sentence in excess of the 
agreed-upon limit.175
 Although the Italian patteggiamento was originally limited to crimes 
punishable by no more than three years, the legislator extended its scope in 
2003 to crimes punishable by up to fi ve year.176 This tendency to expand the 
applicability of the consensual procedures in civil law jurisdictions is notable 
also in Russia, where the provision, modeled on the Italian patteggiamento, 
was applicable to crimes punishable by no more than three years upon fi rst 
reading in the State Duma, but was raised to fi ve years upon passage of the 
new Code of Criminal Procedure in 2001, and up to ten years177 in a 2003 
amendment to the code.178
3.2.5. Statutory Discounts or Free Bargaining Between Prosecution & 
Defense
Statutory discounts for defendants who admit guilt are virtually unknown in 
the US.179 and other common law countries. Naturally there must be some 
incentive to plead guilty and waive the right to a jury trial or trial by professional 
or lay magistrates and a guilty plea is usually considered to be a mitigating 
factor which will lead to a lesser sentence than if one were to be convicted at 
a jury trial. It is generally accepted that English magistrates and crown courts 
will grant around a 1/3 discount to anyone who enters a timely guilty plea, 
175 In §§503-04 CCP-Neuquen (Argentina), the limit is two years and the judge in his or her 
judgment must accept the facts as agreed upon by the parties. Vitale, supra note 134, at 367. 
The Chilean “abbreviated procedure” applies, conformidad-like, if the public and private 
prosecutors in their accusatory pleadings request a punishment of deprivation of liberty which 
does not exceed fi ve years, even though the maximum punishment for the crime could be higher. 
Riego, supra note 127, at 457-58.
176 IT (p. 15). The French reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité (preliminary recognition of 
guilt) is also applicable to crimes punishable by no more than fi ve years deprivation of liberty, 
FR (§495-7 CCP). The Paraguayan “abbreviated procedure” also apparently only applies to 
crimes punishable by up to fi ve years imprisonment. Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at 
413; cf. PAR (§420(1) CCP).
177 10 years is the maximum also in CR (pp. 17, 19).
178 RU (§314 CCP). The Guatemalan “abbreviated procedure” was originally applicable to 
crimes punishable by a maximum of two years, but has now been extended to those punishable 
by no more than fi ve years. §464 CCP-Guatemala, as amended in 1997, Loarca & Bertelotti, 
supra note 174, at 413-414.
179 Often in the US there is a huge differential between the likely sentence after a jury verdict, 
and that offered by the public prosecutor. For instance, in the case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
434 US 357 (1978), fi ve years in the event of a plea and life imprisonment after jury verdict, US 
(pp. 2-3). In earlier days, a guilty plea could statutorily spare a defendant of the death penalty, 
which could only be imposed by a jury. Such provisions were held to be coercive of guilty pleas 
in United States v. Jackson, 390 US 570 (l968).
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though this is nowhere codifi ed and is not binding.180 Although there is no 
codifi ed discount in Scotland, the High Court has ruled that the discount must 
be at least 1/3 upon a timely entry of a guilty plea.181 Nonetheless, the codes 
seldom provide for mandatory mitigation in the event of a guilty plea in the 
sentencing statutes like is often the case in civil law countries.182
 There were no statutory discounts applicable in the traditional Spanish 
conformidad,183 but, with the introduction of the Italian patteggiamento, 
many civil law countries have enacted statutory minimal discounts which 
the sentencing judge must grant if the defendant chooses to terminate the 
proceedings with a guilty plea, “request for punishment,” or expression 
of conformity to the charges.184 The typical discount is one-third of the 
punishment which the judge would have otherwise imposed, taking into 
consideration gravity of offense, and personal characteristics of the offender.185 
In Croatia, however, the sentence to be imposed may not exceed one-third of 
the maximum sentence, resulting in a 2/3 discount.186 In Costa Rica, when the 
defendant accepts the maximum charges presented by the prosecuting parties 
(including the aggrieved party) in a conformidad-like procedure, he or she 
180 For an estimate that the discount is from 25-30%, see Viscount Runciman of Doxford (Ed.), 
The Royal Commision on Criminal Justice, Report §41 (1993).
181 De Plooy v. HM Advocate, 2005 1 JC 1, SC (p. 15); an investigations of the authors has 
shown, however, that some judges started from a higher maximum so as to avoid the necessity 
of a real 1/3 discount. Due to the vast judicial sentencing discretion in Scotland it is impossible 
to know whether the defendant actually gets a 1/3 discount. Id. p. 16.
182 A confession or admission of guilt will substantially mitigate in DE (p. 30), and usually to the 
extent of 1/3 in NO (pp. 3, 9). In SC (p. 15), a statute requires mitigation for a timely entered 
guilty plea.
183 The defendant would accept the correctness of the highest qualifi cation of the charges and 
the highest requested sentence of the public prosecutor and private and popular prosecutors if 
they exist as long as the latter was six years or less and the judge had to sentence below the 
requested punishment. There are also no statutory discounts in SA (p. 6), in Latvia and in BU 
(p. 15), where this absence has been criticized.
184 The name of the Russian procedure is “agreement with the fi led charges.” RU (§314 CCP).
185 IT (p. 15); the 1/3 discount has been introduced in SP (pp. 6-7), in the “expedited trial” 
legislation of 2002, though the sentence of deprivation of liberty may not exceed two years; the 
French réconnaissance de la culpabilité, introduced in 2003, also grants a 1/3 statutory discount. 
In Colombia, §37 CCP allows a defendant to get a 1/3 discount on an “anticipated judgment” 
(sentencia anticipada) if she agrees to the charges before the preliminary investigation is 
complete; the discount falls to 1/6 if she makes this decision after the case is charged and 
before trial. O. J. Guerrero Perralta, Colombia, in J. B. J. Maier et al. (Eds.), Las Reformas 
Procesales Penales en América Latina 234 (2000). In Lithuania, if a defendant subject to 
expedited proceedings agrees to admit guilt, the court may not sentence to more than 2/3 of 
the maximum punishment and may sentence 1/3 less than the minimum required sentence. LI 
(§440(1) CCP).
186 CR (p. 19). In Venezuela, the general discount in cases of admisión de los hechos is from 
1/3 to 1/2 of the sentence which would otherwise be imposed. However, by crimes of violence 
with a maximum punishment which exceeds 8 years, the discount is limited to 1/3, VE (§376 
CCP).
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may not be sentenced to more than 1/3 of the statutory minimum required for 
the offense.187 The “abbreviated procedure” introduced in El Salvador in 1998 
reforms applies to cases punishable by no more than three years deprivation of 
liberty, and the criminal code in such cases requires a sentence not including 
deprivation of liberty in cases where the punishment would have been from 
six months to one year, and allows the judge to suspend jail sentences in 
cases punishable from one to three years.188 A one-fourth discount is given 
according to the Honduran “abbreviated procedure.”189 Although the French 
“recognition of guilt” applies only to cases punishable by fi ve or less years of 
imprisonment, if a prison sentence is imposed it may not exceed six months 
and fi nes may not exceed half of what they would normally have been.190
 In the Estonian “settlement proceedings” the prosecutor, defendant and 
victim enter into a settlement agreement after free negotiations which then 
must be accepted by the judge in its entirety, or rejected, whereupon the case 
must be tried according to the normal procedures.191 In Colombia, an audiencia 
especial (special hearing) may be convoked at which prosecution and defense 
may negotiate the elements of the charged crime and the level of defendant’s 
participation, thus constituting explicit plea, if not sentence bargaining.192
 In some of the recently enacted consensual procedures, specifi c language 
links plea or sentence bargaining to what in the US are called “cooperation 
agreements,” i.e., conditions attached to the “deal” that require the defendant 
to aid in the prosecution of others by testifying, giving information, etc.193 
Such provisions have been introduced in some Latin American194 and of the 
187 §§373-375 CCP-Costa Rica, Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 434.
188 §§379-389, CCP-El Salvador, E. Amaya Cóbar, El procedimiento abreviade en el proceso 
penal de El Salvador, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 402-403. Similarly, the “abbreviated 
procedure” in Guatemala also allows for suspension of imposition of prison sentences up to 
three years and commutation of sentences up to fi ve years. Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, 
at 413.
189 HO (§404(para.4) CCP).
190 FR (§495-8 CCP).
191 ES (§248 CCP). The settlement includes agreement as to the charges, the punishment and the 
amount, if any, of compensation or damages awarded to the aggrieved party or civil complainant. 
ES (§245 CCP). The Nicaraguan “acuerdo” is also subject to unrestricted bargaining between 
the parties, NI (§61(para.1) CCP).
192 As of 2000, however, the procedure was seldom used. Guerrero Peralta, supra note 185, at 
235-36.
193 §5K1.1 US. Sentencing Guidelines provides for so-called “downward departures” for 
cooperation with the federal authorities, which can implicate a sentence below the statutory 
minimum per 18 U.S.C. §3553(e). The prosecutor has virtually complete control over whether 
the “cooperation” of the defendant is suffi cient. Wade v. United States, 504 US 181 (l992).
194 For instance, in NI (§62 CCP), where the testimony of a defendant must be truthful, or 
“the agreement is broken in relation to the punishment imposed and the judge shall sentence 
imposing the punishment which he deems adequate in relation to the acceptance of the acts by 
the accused and the evidence presented.”
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former Soviet republics.195 In Latvia, the 2005 CCP recognizes a defense “right 
to cooperate” with law enforcement offi cials as a basis for its cooperation 
agreements196 which can lead to dismissal of charges in all but the most serious 
cases, as long as the defendant has aided in solving a crime more serious than 
the one he or she was charged with.197
 In the US there are often no promises as to the extent of reduction of 
sentence or whether charges will be dismissed until the defendant actually 
“cooperates” and the prosecution has assessed the quality of such cooperation. 
This model seems to have also been adopted in Moldova, where no actual 
“plea-bargain” is entered into and a formal sentencing hearing is conducted 
before the actual sentence is determined.198
3.2.6. Must the Defendant Admit Guilt?
The Anglo-American “guilty plea” obviously originally assumed the defendant 
would admit the charges contained in the accusatory pleading, but over the 
years judges have also allowed the defendant, in the US, to accept a plea-
bargain, or only enter a plea of nolo contendere,199 which essentially amounts to 
an intent to “not contest” the charges, and do not require an explicit admission 
195 Chapter LXIV of the Georgian Code of Criminal Procedure signed into law on February 13, 
2004 introduces a “plea agreement” designed to substitute for the full criminal trial. (§679-1(1) 
CCP). The “plea agreement” appears to be primarily introduced to effectuate co-operation of the 
defendant in the prosecution of public corruption and other serious crimes. (§679-1(2) CCP). 
In exchange, the prosecutor will ask for a reduced sentence or even, in the case of exceptional 
aid in solving serious cases, be able to dismiss the prosecution. (§§679-1(5,9) CCP). If the 
testimony or other co-operation proffered by the defendant is deemed to be unreliable or fail 
to prove guilt of the crime against the third party, the plea agreement shall be null and void. 
(§679-1(8) CCP). In LI (§210 CCP), the preliminary investigation may be suspended in cases 
of suspects who help in the detection of the activities of a “criminal association” after the 
suspect has confessed to such participation. However, if the suspect refuses to give evidence in 
the case of a member of such association, the proceedings may be re-opened. In laying out the 
procedure for plea-bargains in Moldova, the prosecutor should take into account “the desire of 
the accused, defendant to aid in the realization of the criminal prosecution or accusation of other 
persons.” MO (§505(1)(1) CCP).
196 The “right to cooperate” can be expressed in: (1) choosing a simpler type of procedure; (2) 
infl uencing the conduct of the procedure; or (3) uncovering criminal acts committed by other 
persons. LA (§§21, 66(1)(20) CCP). In Moldova, the defendant also has the “right” to admit the 
charge and conclude an agreement to plead guilty, to agree to special procedures, to reconcile 
with the victim. MO (§§64(2)(8,9,10,21) CCP).
197 LA (§410(1,2) CCP).
198 Although the “agreement to admit guilt” is called a “deal between the public prosecutor 
and the accused … who gave his agreement to admit his guilt along with a shortening of the 
punishment,” MO (§504(a) CCP) it appears that any recommendation of the prosecutor can be 
rejected by the judge who determines the punishment after argument of the parties. MO (§§508-
09 CCP).
199 US (p. 2).
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of the facts underlying the accusatory pleading.200 Other judges may require 
an admission of guilt or they will not accept the plea.201 Furthermore, some 
US judges would even accept a “guilty plea” in cases where the defendant 
actually denied guilt for the offense charged.202 This practice was upheld by 
the US Supreme Court, as long as the judge made sure there was a factual 
basis for a fi nding of guilt.203
 The Spanish procedure of conformidad, somewhat like a US plea of nolo 
contendere, does not require an explicit admission of guilt, but is tantamount to 
an expression that the defendant has no objection, or expresses his agreement, 
with the charges.204 The Italian applicazione della pena sulla richieste delle 
parte (application of punishment upon request of the parties) also was just as 
the title suggested: a request for punishment and not an admission of guilt. 
Many of the procedures modeled after the Italian patteggiamento also do 
not require any admission of guilt.205 On the other hand, an unconditional 
admission of guilt is a prerequisite for the triggering of the guilty-plea-type 
procedures in some countries.206
200 US (p. 4).
201 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) allows each judge to decide whether they will require an admission of 
guilt, US (p. 4).
202 This is only possible in SA (p. 6), when defendants plead guilty to fi ne-only offenses and 
never actually go to court.
203 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25 (1970), US (p. 4). Such pleas are not accepted in 
England and Wales, R. Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in England and Wales, in R. Hatchard et 
al., Comparative Criminal Procedure 20 (1996).
204 In other words, the defendant must admit that he is the accused who has been charged, SP (p. 
2). Similarly in the Argentine federal CCP, he must agree that the act charged is true and that he 
was the perpetrator, Bovino, supra note 161, at 66. Bovino sees this as being tantamount to a 
confession. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 242. In CH (§406 CCP) it appears that the language of 
the Spanish procedure has been adopted, not requiring an explicit acceptance of guilt, though 
there is a dispute in the literature as to whether the conformidad is tantamount to a confession 
of guilt. Riego, supra note 127, at 462. No admission of guilt is required in Costa Rica, Llobet 
Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 440, or El Salvador, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 404.
205 CR (pp. 17, 19, but the defendant may not present evidence of innocence after requesting 
punishment in order to try to achieve an acquittal, unless this evidence was newly discovered). 
Although Estonian “settlement proceedings” are not patterned after the Italian patteggiamento 
but more on American plea-bargaining, an explicit admission of guilt is now not required, 
though an earlier procedure called “simplifi ed proceedings,” introduced by amending the 1961 
Soviet-era code, did require a confession. M. Sillaots, Admission and Confession of Guilt in 
Settlement Proceedings under Estonian Criminal Procedure, IX Juridica International (Univ. 
of Tartu, Estonia) (2004), at 117.
206 SA (p. 6); DE (p. 29); BU (p. 14); PO (pp. 16-17); BO (§373 CCP); HO (§403(2), (3)(a) 
CCP); PAR (§420(2) CCP); VE (§376 CCP) (“admission of the facts”); FR (§495-7 CCP) 
(“admit the acts”). See also §679-3(2) CCP-Georgia. It is one of the circumstances that must 
be taken into consideration by the prosecutor upon agreeing to accept a plea in Moldova. MO 
(§505(1)(4) CCP). If an “agreement” is concluded during the trial in Latvia, the defendant must 
completely admit his guilt, LA (§544(2)(3) CCP).
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3.2.7. Procedural Aspects: Stage of Proceedings, Veto by Judge, Prosecutor, 
or Aggrieved Party?
Procedural economy is maximized, of course, the earlier in the proceedings 
the defendant agrees to resolve the case consensually without a trial. On 
the other hand, without a minimum of investigative activity, there may be 
insuffi cient evidence for a judge to be able to assure a factual foundation for 
the judgment.207 In the US, guilty pleas may be entered anywhere from the 
fi rst appearance in court to the stage of jury deliberations after all evidence 
has been taken and closing arguments of the parties have been made.208 In the 
UK, on the other hand, there are efforts to try to prohibit, or at least lessen 
the discount on punishment, for pleas made in the trial court, or after trial has 
begun. In international criminal proceedings, a guilty plea may be proffered at 
initial appearance, during pretrial proceedings, or during the trial.209
 While the Spanish conformidad may be effectuated during the preliminary 
investigation or at its termination,210 among the new European procedures, 
many, beginning with the Italian patteggiamento, foresee that the procedure 
will take place during the preliminary hearing before the giudice dell’udienza 
preliminare211 after the preliminary investigation has been completed.212 The 
procedures in Italy, as elsewhere, may also be implemented when the case is 
207 This criticism has been levied against the Guatemalan “abbreviated procedure” which may 
be triggered any time during the preliminary investigation, Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, 
at 424-25.
208 The same is true in SC (p. 15).
209 Knoops, supra note 6, at 259. For slightly different procedures depending on whether an 
“agreement” is reached pretrial or at trial, see LA (§§539-45 CCP).
210 SP (p. 2); in CR (p. 19), requests for punishment may only be made up to and at the 
completion of the preliminary investigation. In the Argentine federal CCP the juicio abreviado 
may be triggered by the accused’s conformidad at any time up to the setting of trial. Córdoba, 
supra note 38, at 231. In El Salvador, the “abbreviated procedure” must be commenced before 
the preliminary hearing, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 403. In Honduras, the “abbreviated 
procedure” must be initiated before the case is set for trial, HO (§403(1) CCP).
211 IT (p. 16); a preliminary hearing, presided over by the investigating magistrate, was introduced 
in the 1995 Spanish Jury Law, and some courts, and the offi ce of the public prosecutor, believe 
that a conformidad in a jury case should be reached during the preliminary hearing, for then 
there is no need to select a jury, there being no adversarial controversy, SP (pp. 9-10). In Costa 
Rica, the motion for application of the procedimiento abreviado is made before the pretrial judge 
during the preliminary hearing and sentencing is then before the trial judge. Llobet Rodríguez, 
supra note 172, at 440.
212 The request for an conformidad-like “abbreviated trial” is also made after the conclusion 
of the preliminary investigation in: BO (§373 CCP). The Chilean “abbreviated trial” may be 
requested during the hearing to prepare the trial, CH (§406CCP).
982 STEPHEN C. THAMAN 
transferred to the trial court,213 or even at the beginning214 or at times during 
the actual trial.215 
 Clearly in countries with different court compositions depending on the 
seriousness of the charge, it is more likely that guilty pleas will be forthcoming 
in the courts dealing with the lower and middle level offenses, rather than 
the higher courts with lay participation, especially in Europe where they are 
reserved for the most serious offenses.216
 In some jurisdictions in the US, and in other countries as well, the judge 
may veto a proposed consensual resolution of the case and set the case for 
a full-blown trial.217 Where the judge may veto the procedure, however, the 
judge’s act will always reveal a pre-evaluation of the evidence which should, 
theoretically, make that judge biased to act as trier of fact at the trial.218 
The prosecution or defense may appeal the judge’s veto to a higher court 
213 In IT (p. 16), the procedure takes place in the trial court if the case is tried by a single judge; 
also, if the procedure was rejected in Italy and the case proceeds through a normal trial, the 
judge may nonetheless impose the reduced punishment at the conclusions despite the contrary 
decision of the judge of the preliminary hearing.
214 Conformidad may also be accepted at the beginning of trials of both adults and minors, when 
the defendant is questioned, SP (pp. 2, 13); see also, SA (p. 7). 
215 In BU (p. 13), negotiations between public prosecutor and counsel at the time of indictment, 
and the settlement may occur as late as during the trial. The fact that the Venezuelan “admission 
of the facts” can take place during the trial has been criticized on grounds of procedural 
economy. E. L. Pérez Sarmiento, Comentarios al Código Orgánico Procesal Penal 420 (3d ed. 
2000).
216 Thus conformidades are not likely in Spanish jury courts for the most frequent crime subject 
to its jurisdiction, homicide, but are used for a number of lesser crimes, like threats, setting of 
forest fi res, trespassing, or minor bribery cases, which are also subject to the court. Yet they are 
very frequent in the professional courts which preside over Spanish “abbreviate procedure,” a 
streamlined procedure which simplifi es both preliminary investigation and trial and is designed 
to be very accommodating to the institution of conformidad, SP (pp. 4, 9-10).
217 SA (p. 7). Since in SP (p. 5, 9), only the judge can exercise jurisdiction, she may not be a 
passive participant during the conformidad procedure and may reject a proposed settlement if 
the qualifi cation of the charge seems inappropriate or if it appears the defendant did not freely or 
knowingly proffer his conformity with the charges; the same is true in BU (p. 14), in addition, if 
the court thinks that a plea agreement does not adequately consider the public and the victim’s 
interests, or is “contrary to law or morals.” All Argentine procedures allow the judge to veto 
the procedures. Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 310. Cf. BO (§373); CH (§410 CCP). The 
same is true in Guatemala, Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at 427, Georgia (§§679-3(2)(d), 
679-4(4-6) CCP) and Latvia (§541(6) CCP). Either the judge of the preliminary hearing or the 
trial judge may reject a conformidad in Costa Rica if they doubt its veracity. Llobet Rodríguez, 
supra note 172, at 440. In ES (§248 CCP) the judge may either accept or reject the “settlement” 
entered into by prosecution and defense, but may not alter it.
218 If the judge thinks the punishment is too lenient, then he/she would be biased against the 
defendant and if he thinks an acquittal should be forthcoming, he is then biased against the 
prosecution. Vitale, supra note 134, at 376-78. This is a possible problem in Guatemala, where 
the code is unclear as to whether the same judge who rejects a consensual resolution will 
ultimately try the case. Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at 429.
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in some countries.219 The aggrieved party (victim) has no procedural role 
in most systems of consensual resolution of criminal cases,220 though their 
position on the case may affect the decision of the public prosecutor.221 In 
a minority of jurisdictions, however, the aggrieved party must agree for the 
procedures to be applied.222 In some jurisdictions, the judge plays no role in 
plea-bargaining, which takes place exclusively between the public prosecutor 
and the defendant.223
 While the right to counsel may be waived in the US and plea-bargains 
accepted in the absence of counsel,224 appointment of counsel is mandatory in 
many jurisdictions,225 for settlement discussions to take place, and some civil 
law jurisdictions require that the defendant have full discovery of the entire 
contents of the investigative fi le.226 In the US the defendant must explicitly 
be advised of his or her right to remain silent, right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to a jury trial227 and must waive these rights 
219 This is true in CR (pp. 17, 20).
220 IT (p. 15); PO (p. 17); SC (p. 16). In only seven US states does the victim have a right to 
participate in plea-bargaining proceedings, US (p. 1).
221 SA (p. 7). In El Salvador the judge must hear the position of the victim, but may order 
the “abbreviated procedure” over her objection, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 404. The 
aggrieved party has a right to be heard only in France, which, according to Saas, supra note 82, 
at 840, means that they seldom will.
222 BU (p. 15); PO (p. 17); RU (§314(1) CCP); BO (§373 CCP); ES (§239(2)(4) CCP). Under 
the Spanish conformidad procedures, the defendant must stipulate to the truth of the accusatory 
pleading, whether that of the public prosecutor, the private prosecutor (victim) or the popular 
prosecutor, whichever seeks the most serious qualifi cation of the criminal act and the highest 
punishment. Similary, in Chile, if the victim charges a more serious charge that carries with it 
a punishment that exceeds fi ve years, the procedimiento abreviado will not apply, CH (§408 
CCP). The victim must agree to the conformidad-like proceedings, as well, in the CCP-Tierra 
del Fuego, Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 302.
223 SC (pp. 15-16). The court may not refuse to accept a plea and may only ask the prosecutor 
to reconsider. The imposition of punishment, however, which is not subject to bargaining, is 
completely up to the judge. Prosecutor and defense, following recent reforms, may also agree 
on a narrative of the offense for purposes of fi xing the limits of aggravation and mitigation, Id., 
p. 22.
224 According to Iowa v. Tovar, 541 US 77 (2004), counsel may be waived without the necessity 
of advising the defendant that waiving counsel may leave him ignorant of viable defenses and 
deprive him of the opportunity to obtain useful legal advice about the wisdom of pleading 
guilty, US (p. 8-9). The US Supreme Court has even validated waivers of the right to counsel 
and pleas of guilty by arguably schizophrenic people to capital murder! Godinez v. Moran, 509 
US 389 (1993).
225 BU (p. 13); MO (§506(3)(1-2) CCP); LA (§83(2) CCP).
226 BU (p. 13). This is not true in the US, where the prosecutor need not reveal exculpatory 
evidence prior to a plea and this does not undermine the “knowing” nature of the plea, United 
States v. Ruiz, 536 US 622 (2002), US (p. 3).
227 US (p. 3).
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on the record in open court for the guilty plea to be accepted. Similar waivers 
are required in other countries as well.228
 In proceedings before ICTY and ICTR, four basic requirements are 
required for a plea to be accepted.229 The plea must be made voluntarily in full 
cognizance of the nature of charge and its consequences. Iit must be informed, 
not only in relation to the recognition of guilt, but also to the implications of 
a guilty plea in the context of defense strategy. It must be unequivocal,230 and 
there must be a factual basis for the plea.231
 In the US and in some other countries, the prosecution may not use any 
statements made by the defendant during discussions related to consensual 
proceedings in a trial if the negotiations break down or if the consensual 
procedures are rejected by the judge.232
3.2.7. Does Charge or Sentence Bargaining Precede the Application of the 
Procedure?
As the term plea bargaining in America indicates, intensive bargaining and 
negotiating between public prosecutor and defendant, and sometimes even 
the judge, usually precedes the defendant’s “guilty plea.”233 In the U.K., on the 
contrary, it is maintained that the guilty plea is induced only by an expectation 
of a mitigated sentence if one pleads guilty.234
 In most of the new systems that have sprouted up in civil law jurisdictions 
there is no specifi c mention of bargaining, only a codifi ed establishment of the 
discount a person will be entitled to upon consensual resolution of the case. 
Sometimes a sentence is suggested by the public prosecutor, which invokes 
similarities to the Spanish conformidad or the penal order.235 Bargaining, 
however, likely occurs outside of court in many of these countries.236 In some 
228 In SA (p. 7), the defendant must be advised of the presumption of innocence, the prosecution’s 
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
229 These requirements are listed in Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE.
230 In the Erdemovic case, the defendant pleaded guilty but said he acted under superior orders 
and duress. Since this could have constituted a defense, the appeals chamber refused to accept 
the plea and ordered a trial. Knoops, supra note 6, at 259-260.
231 Id.
232 BU (p. 14); this is true in GR (§679-5 CCP) only if the breakdown in negotiations was due to 
an unexplained withdrawal of the defendant.
233 In SC (p. 15), there is informal bargaining as to charge and even the narrative relating to the 
charge in the accusatory pleading so as to further restrict the judge’s discretion in relation to 
assessing aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
234 Hatchard, supra note 203, at 220.
235 In France the public prosecutor makes a public recommendation of sentence at the time of the 
guilty plea. FR (§495-8 CCP).
236 IT (p. 15). As to possibility of bargaining in Chile, see Riego, supra note 127, at 463-64.
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countries, participation of the judge is expressly prohibited.237 A more common 
occurrence than charge bargaining, however, will be bargaining on the 
parameters of the sentence.238 A few countries, however, some of which were 
greatly infl uenced by American consultants during the discussions leading 
up to their criminal procedure reforms, have explicitly allowed bargaining 
between prosecution and defense before “plea agreements” are reached.239
3.2.8. Judicial Control: May Judge Acquit, Impose Lesser Sentence, Lesser 
Charge?
In the US, if a judge accepts an explicit plea bargain, then the judge must 
impose the bargained-for punishment.240 The only exception, is if at sentencing 
some new evidence has come to the attention of the judge which leads her to 
believe that the agreed punishment, or the agreed charge does not refl ect the 
facts of the case or the relative guilt of the defendant.241 Then the judge must 
allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty. In the federal system 
and in some states, the only promise that might be made to the defendant is 
that the prosecution will not oppose his or her request for a certain punishment, 
and in such cases the judge may sentence higher than the punishment the 
prosecution has agreed not to oppose. At other times, the punishment depends 
on the terms of a “plea agreement” and is often dependent on the defendant 
testifying in another case truthfully or otherwise aiding with the prosecution of 
a more serious case, and if the prosecutor asserts this has not been done, then 
the judge may sentence to whatever sentence he or she deems is appropriate, 
as long as it is within the sentencing parameters.
237 SA (p. 7). Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 11(c) prohibits the judge from taking part in plea negotiations 
in the US federal courts and other US states follow this model. However, other states, such as 
California, allow direct involvement of the judge in negotiating the bargain in relation both to 
charge and punishment. La Fave et al., supra note 20, at 1002. 
238 In SA (pp. 6-7), the parties: may negotiate a “just sentence to be imposed by the court.” 
In IT (p. 15), the sentence requested is also a product of bargaining between the parties. In 
conformidad proceedings within the framework of Spanish “abbreviated procedure” the 
sentence is often a subject of bargaining, SP (pp. 4-5); in CR (p. 19), the party requesting 
application of punishment will expressly state the type and length of punishment it desires and 
only this punishment may be imposed.
239 This is also the model adopted by the ICTY/R. This is the case with the Estonian “settlement 
proceedings.” Sillaots, supra note 205, at 117.
240 Some courts, however, say the judge is never bound, if, during sentence, she thinks the 
bargained punishment does not refl ect seriousness of the criminal conduct, but others courts 
say lenience itself is not a suffi cient ground, US (p. 2).
241 If the plea agreement calls for dismissal of charges, a federal court may defer its decision to 
accept or reject the bargain until the judge has seen a presentence report and formed an opinion 
about the gravity of the underlying conduct, US (p. 2).
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 In December 2001, Rule 62 ter of the ICTY RPE was adopted which 
provides that prosecution and defense may bargain to amend the indictment, 
together recommend a specifi c sentence or sentencing range, or the prosecutor 
may agree not to oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence 
or sentencing range. The plea agreement must normally be disclosed in open 
court, and the trial judge is not bound by the parties’ agreement.242 
 With the Spanish conformidad and some of the modern guilty-plea-like 
procedures, the judge may actually acquit the defendant, if he or she fi nds a 
fact that would exclude guilt, either substantively or procedurally.243 In the 
conformidad procedures of the Argentine federal CCP, the judge may reject 
the procedure due to insuffi cient knowledge of the facts of the case or because 
the qualifi cation of the offense does not correspond to the facts.244 Punishment 
may be imposed for lesser offenses, also, if the proposed charges are not 
supported by the facts.245 Often the discount is only a 1/3 off of what the judge 
would otherwise have imposed as a sentence, which means that there is no 
actual promise as to what the sentence will be.246 In some countries, however, 
the judge must impose the sentence which the defendant or the parties have 
applied for.247
242 Knoops, supra note 6, at 262. In Prosecutor v. Nikolic (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, Feb. 
4, 2005, Case No. IT-94-2-!, para. 89, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that Trial Chambers 
shall give due consideration to the recommendation of the parties and, should the sentence 
diverge substantially from that recommendation, give reasons for the departure.” Id.
243 IT (p. 16). In the ICTY/R an admission of guilt also does not require a conviction. Knoops, 
supra note 6, at 263. Judicial Acquittal is also possible in the Argentine province of Tierra del 
Fuego, Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 302, Chile, Riego, supra note 127, at 460 and El 
Salvador, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 404-05. In the conformidad-type procedures, the 
judge may not sentence to a higher term than that requested by the public (or private or popular) 
prosecutor: The same is true in BO (§374 CCP), and El Salvador, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 
188, at 405. In Guatemalan “abbreviated trials” rough statistics show, for instance, that judges 
returned 203 convictions and three acquittals in Guatemala City in 1996, 174 convictions and 
10 acquittals in 1997 and 130 convictions and 9 acquittals in 1998, Loarca & Bertelotti, supra 
note 174, at 424. In Latvia the judge may “dismiss” the case if there are procedural impediments 
to conducting a trial, LA (§542(1)(1) CCP).
244 Córdoba, supra note 38, at 231; cf. Langer, supra note 13, at 55. In Moldova, the judge, after 
a detailed examination of the defendant regarding voluntariness of the plea, understanding of 
charges, etc. MO (§506 CCP), decides whether to accept or reject the guilty plea. MO (§507 
CCP). The judge may reject the procedure in France as well. FR (§495-12 CCP).
245 In SA (pp. 6, 8) the judge may sentence to less than the term already reduced by 1/3 under the 
new expedited procedure.
246 In France, prison time may not exceed one year nor be more than 1/2 the amount of time 
which would have been assessed under the normal procedure, Saas, supra note 82, at 831.
247 IT (p. 14).
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3.2.10. Judgment: Must Judge Give Reasons? Does it Result in Judgment of 
Guilt?
In the Common Law tradition, judges generally do not have to give reasons 
for the judgments they issue, even if it is a judgment by a judge sitting alone as 
trier of the facts, though judges in the US sometimes do include reasons. Juries 
do not have to give reasons in Common Law countries,248 and judges, when 
accepting a guilty plea, do not need to write a reasoned judgment. The guilty 
plea is itself suffi cient to impose judgment. Upon accepting a plea, however, 
the judge in the US must be convinced that there is a “factual basis for the 
plea.”249 When this requirement is taken seriously,250 which is not always the 
case, the recitation of the “factual basis” may simply be that the prosecutor 
asserts, that he or she would have proved the contents of the indictment.251
 Most modern European procedures with guilty-plea type arrangements, 
require some kind of judicial activity which is similar to that a judge must do 
after a full-blown trial, usually consisting in the giving of reasons why guilt 
was deemed to have been proved and the particular sentence imposed.252 With 
the Italian patteggiamento the procedure for writing the judgment (which is not 
one of guilt, but tantamount thereto) is much more simple than that required in 
248 Though in Austria and in the new Spanish jury system, there has been introduced a requirement 
that jurors, for instance in Spain, provide “succinct reasons” why they arrived at their verdict.
249 Fed. R. Crim. p. 11, US (p. 2). Along the same lines, in PO (pp. 16-17), although there will be 
no more taking of evidence after a “voluntary acceptance of responsibility,” the circumstances 
of the commission of the crime must be “beyond doubt.” Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE has also 
imposed this requirement. Knoops, supra note 6 at 260.
250 Some courts have said the government need not demonstrate strong evidence of guilt in setting 
out the factual basis where there is otherwise adequate evidence to support the government’s 
allegations, US (p. 4).
251 For an opinion that the procedure announcing the plea and the factual basis is often a “carefully 
rehearsed charade during which the participants merely enact a script that was carefully crafted 
in the backroom of the prosecutor’s offi ce.” Dubber, supra note 136, at 552 (1997).
252 The requirements for the judgment are the same as in normal cases in Chile, only the facts 
relied on are those stipulated in the “abbreviated trial.” Riego, supra note 127, at 460. The same 
appears to be the case in Moldova, MO (§509 CCP). In Latvia, the procedure is still called a 
“trial” and the judgment must include an appraisal of the legal justifi cation for the agreement and 
the measure of punishment. If the judge has a doubt as to guilt he must reject the “agreement.” 
LA (§543 CCP). In France the judge must justify (homologuer) the judgment as to the charge, 
based usually in the admission, and as to the sentence, based in the characteristics of the 
defendant. This judgment has the same effect as a normal judgment of guilt. FR (§§495-9, 495-
11 CCP). In accordance with a decision of the Constitutional Council, the judge should verify: 
“the reality of the acts, their legal qualifi cation and the appropriateness of the punishment.” One 
commentator has called this a boiteuse (wobbly) intervention of the judge, Saas, supra, note 82, 
at 841.
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a normal case and focuses mainly on appraising the congruity of the sentence 
with the facts of the case.253 The same is true in other countries.254
 On the other hand, it appears that in Estonia and other countries, the judge 
must either accept or reject the “settlement” but if it is accepted, there is no 
formal judgment, but just an affi rmation of the terms of the agreement, which 
include charge, damages to the aggrieved party and sentence.255
3.2.11. Can the Defendant Appeal after Agreeing to Consensual Procedures?
In some countries, the defendant has no right to appeal the results of a 
consensual procedure if the judgment is not more severe than that which was 
promised him in the bargain, or by statute.256 In others, the right to appeal is 
sancrosanct, even after the invocation of consensual proceedings.257 
 In the US a plea-bargain, otherwise attractive to the defendant, may include 
as a condition thereof, waiver of the right to appeal258 or to take other post-
conviction action, such as a writ of habeas corpus.259 In other countries such 
waivers are expressly prohibited until after the defendant has actually been 
sentenced.260 A guilty-plea coupled with dismissal of charges and sentence 
253 IT (p. 14, 16), the judge must give reasons, even if succinctly on the impossibility of acquitting 
and on the congruity of punishment.
254 In BU (p. 15), a judge who accepts a “plea agreement” need not write a fully reasoned 
judgment; in CR (pp. 19-21), the court shall only state “the circumstances that were taken 
into consideration in imposing punishment” and bases this “judgment” on the facts in the 
investigative dossier; in SP (p. 5), the court must verify that the qualifi cation of the crime 
subject to the conformidad is correct, the punishment justifi ed, and that the defendant’s decision 
was made freely and knowingly.
255 ES (§249 CCP).
256 In SP (p. 6), appeal is only possible if the deal was violated or if consent is coerced; in IT 
(p. 17), a patteggiamento cannot be appealed, but may be reviewed in cassation based on an 
allegation that the defendant did not actually waive important procedural rights.
257 In SC (p. 16), the defendant may always appeal, but may not move to withdraw her plea. 
Appeal is allowed according to the regular procedure in the Argentine federal CCP, Córdoba, 
supra note 38, at 232, and following the “abbreviated procedure” in Chile. Riego, supra note 
127, at 460-61, notes that appeal is considered to be more important in such cases due to the 
weakness of the factual foundation for a fi nding of guilt. An appeal in cassation is permitted in 
LA (§542(2) CCP). As to the right to appeal in France, see Saas, supra note 82, at 841.
258 US (pp. 3-4). Some courts have held that after a guilty plea, a defendant may not litigate the 
voluntariness of a confession given to the police, McMann v. Richardson, 397 US 759 (1970) 
or whether the proceedings should have been barred by double jeopardy, United States v. Broce, 
488 US 563 (1989). Id.
259 Although in US (p. 4), a habeas corpus action based on incompetence of counsel may never 
be waived as part of a plea bargain.
260 DE (p. 32), except minor cases with punishment of less than 21 daily rates or 3000 Kroner, 
which are not subject to appeal. Sometimes the prosecutor will bargain to dismiss other cases if 
the defendant does not appeal, but this practice is viewed as highly questionable.
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discounts in the US may be withdrawn before accepted by the judge,261 and 
even after acceptance, if the judge has not yet pronounced sentence.262 After 
sentence withdrawal of a plea usually requires the defendant to show that a 
“manifest injustice” will occur.263
3.2.12. Criticism in the Literature
In European countries with the inquisitorial tradition in which the investigating 
offi cial, the juge d’instruction was originally also the sentencing offi cial, the 
legislator has been meticulous to ensure that the judge who presides over the 
consensual resolution of the case is not either the investigating magistrate, or, 
of course, the ultimate trial judge. In 1988 the Spanish Constitutional Court 
found an earlier version of abbreviated trial to be unconstitutional because the 
investigating magistrate acted as trial judge in the abbreviated procedure.264 
The new conformidad provisions, in which the investigating magistrate (juez 
instructor) presides over arraignment, formulation of charges, and eventual 
conformidad in the mostly fl agrant cases subject to expedited trial, has also 
been criticized because the role of sentencing and investigating judge have 
been combined.265
 In Italy, the roles of two pretrial judges have been differentiated, so as not 
to confuse the judge who exercises control over the preliminary investigation, 
the so-called giudice delle indagine preliminarii with the giudice dell’udienza 
preliminaria, who supervises the alternative procedures, including the 
patteggiamento.266
 Generally, consensual procedures are still criticized in civil law countries 
for violating the legality principle by not requiring an actual trial267 and a 
261 United States v. Hyde, 520 US 670 (1997), US (p. 5).
262 For instance, if there is a “fair and just reason,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2), such as a witness’s 
credible recanting of testimony, the discovery of potentially exculpatory evidence United 
States v. Ruiz, 229 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2000), or an intervening court decision that might entitle 
defendant to a dismissal, United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004), US (p. 
5).
263 Fed. R. Crim.P. 32, US (p. 5).
264 V. Gimeno Sendra et al., Derecho Procesal Penal 32, 765-66 (1996); the French injonction 
pénale was invalidated in 1994 by the Conseil constitutionnel for similar reasons. Pradel, supra 
note 75, at 204.
265 Proponents of the new law note, however, that the juez instructor has not yet performed 
any investigative functions when these cases come before her in the municipal investigative 
courts, usually the next day after arrest, SP (p. 7). This criticism has also been levied against 
the El Salvadoran “abbreviated procedure” which is conducted by the investigating magistrate. 
Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 405.
266 W. T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in 
Italy, 25 Mich. J. Int’L L 429, 436 (2004).
267 Some Argentine critics interpret the constitutional right to a previous trial before imposition of 
sentence as being non-waivable, and requiring, theoretically, a jury trial (the constitutional right 
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clear judicial fi nding of guilt.268 Prosecutorial charging, or the maximum 
punishment requested, determines whether the guilty plea procedures will be 
used in some countries, thus allowing the prosecutor to effectively engineer the 
avoidance of a trial with all the guarantees.269 Some critics see such procedures 
as inherently coercive,270 while others believe they open up the possibility 
of unequal treatment of similarly situated cases in different courts due to 
different approaches of prosecutors or judges.271 In other countries, critics see 
the consensual procedures as violating the right to a defense, the presumption 
of innocence, and the right to personal liberty for similar reasons.272 Some 
critics feel that plea-bargaining systems lead to disproportionate lenience in 
sentencing in relation to the serious of the crime.273 The lack of traditional 
reasons for the judgment and the limited appellate possibilities have also been 
subject to criticism.274 On the other hand, the procedural economy gained by 
such mechanisms has often been considered to be more important than the 
procedural defi cits on the other side.275
to jury trial in Argentina, guaranteed since 1857, has still not been implemented with legislation 
however!), Bovino, supra note 161, at 67. Cf. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 236-37; others, like 
Gustavo Bruzzone, believe the right can be waived like other important constitutional rights. 
Id., at 237. For a view that the relative disappearance of lay participation in both the US, due 
to plea bargaining, and in Germany, due to confession bargaining, expansion of the jurisdiction 
of the single judge courts and the use of diversion and penal orders, has led to a defi cit in 
legitimation of the justice systems. Dubber, supra note 136, at 553, 601.
268 SP (p. 14); in BU (p. 15), this was cause for vehement criticism when the new procedureswere 
introduced although the criticism has since subsided. The Estonian settlement proceedings 
have been criticized, because the bargaining is conducted before the defendant agrees to the 
stipulation. If there is a full confession, which need not be the case, the punishment has been set 
before the full facts of the case have been laid out. Sillaots, supra note 205, at 120-21.
269 This is true with Spanish conformidad as well as with its Argentine offspring, Bovino, supra 
note 161, at 66.
270 CR (p. 21). In SC (p. 20), as well, critics feel that plea-bargaining induces the innocent to 
forego a trial and punishes those who are convicted after trial; as to Argentina, see Córdoba, 
supra note 38, at 250.
271 In BU (p. 16), there are fears that wealthy defendants can bribe the prosecutors for sweet deals. 
In the US (p. 6), prosecutors may reward defendants, whose lawyers are generally compliant in 
encouraging plea-bargains or to ensure future compliance, or may refuse otherwise justifi able 
bargains to please victims or the police.
272 IT (p. 17).
273 BU (p. 16); see US (p. 6), for the opinion that it is “irrational” to reduce otherwise appropriate 
sentences just due to save court time. In SC (pp. 20-21), the High Court has set aside some 
judgments on the grounds of excessive lenience of the sentence, at times because the plea was 
entered late in the proceedings, thus sacrifi cing the goals of procedural economy.
274 DE (p. 33). In Argentina the conformidad procedure has been criticized for justifying 
mitigation in the procedural behavior of the defendant, rather than in facts relating to the crime 
or the person of the defendant. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 247.
275 CR (p. 21); after early criticism, the new procedure has been welcomed in BU (p. 16) due to 
its speeding up of caseloads and there are efforts to extend it to drug cases. In SC (p. 20), the 
High Court has given its stamp of approval for plea-bargaining based on reasons of procedural 
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 In the US the great disparities between minimum and maximum 
punishments and the limited sentencing discretion enjoyed by judges in the 
federal and some state systems, due to the presence of sentencing guidelines, 
have led to criticism that it is the prosecutor, rather than the court, who 
determines the charge and the sentence with little infl uence of the court.276 It 
is also often remarked, that it is the innocent themselves that are most coerced 
into entering pleas, because the differential between maximum and minimum 
punishments is the greatest, for the weakness of the prosecution’s case will 
lead it to accept even a minimal or token punishment.277 Even if the defendant 
is guilty, the Draconian sentences constitute such a pressure to plead guilty 
that John Langbein has compared American plea-bargaining to the use of 
torture on the pre-19th Century European continent.278 The nearly uncontrolled 
opportunity principle in the US, coupled with sprawling untheoretical penal 
codes containing multiple offenses with nearly the same elements, also enable 
the public prosecutor to “overcharge” cases in order to pressure the defendant 
to plead guilty with the promise of dismissing charges.279
 Furthermore, US plea-bargaining has been criticized because it encourages 
deception, gamesmanship and outright dishonesty in the relations between 
prosecution and defense.280 Illegal searches and interrogation methods 
are directly or indirectly encouraged by the prevalence of plea-bargaining, 
because the violations will never be litigated in court, or the right to litigate 
them will be waived as part of the plea-bargain.281
economy and has stressed that it raises public confi dence in the court system when only the 
most serious or the most disputed cases are brought to a full-blown trial. In Costa Rica, judges 
and prosecutors are satisfi ed with the new abbreviated procedure due to its savings in time and 
resources. Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 435.
276 US (p. 1). Langbein condemns the merging of “accusatory, decisional and sentencing phases 
of procedure in a single offi cial, the prosecutor.” Langbein, supra note 51, at 18.
277 Damaska, supra note 4, at 1028; Langbein, supra note 51, at 13; Dubber, supra note 136, at 
600. See also US (p. 6).
278 See in general, Langbein, supra note 51. Both are methods to bypass the evidentiary demands 
of the procedure, whether it be those of the formal rules of evidence derived from Canon 
law, or the complicated evidentiary rules of American procedure. Both systems are and were 
equally ineffective in ensuring reliability of the “coerced” admissions and equally productive 
of cynicism about the way the criminal law is administered. US (p. 7); on the other hand, 
Stuntz and Scott claim that the wide margins between maximum and minimum sentences do not 
necessarily compel pleas, for such a claim would punish the lenience offered by prosecutors in 
such cases, Id., p. 8.
279 Id., p. 9. Stuntz and Scott admit, however, that if plea bargaining were disallowed and all 
cases went to trial, overcharging would stop. Id. p. 10. According to Damaska, supra note 4, at 
1027, overcharging compels the American defendant to “spend his bargaining chips to reduce 
charges down to the level that was the prosecutor’s desideratum all along.”
280 US (p. 6).
281 US (p. 6). For instance, issues of arguably compelled confessions, McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759 (l970), or illegally constituted grand juries, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 
(l973), are foreclosed by a guilty plea. 
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 It has been further alleged that it is the incredibly complicated, time-and-
resource-consuming American jury trial that has led to such a steady growth 
of plea-bargaining. Some voices have called for simplifi cation of the jury trial, 
or more use of court trials,282 or even the mixed court, in order to extend more 
trials to more people.
 On the other hand, there are voices in the literature who feel that there will 
be even more convictions of the innocent if cases were tried before professional 
judges, mixed courts, or even juries if the procedures were expedited with less 
guarantees for the defense.283
3.2.13. Benefi ts in Procedural Economy: Extent of Usage of Guilty Plea 
Mechanisms
No civil law country has come even close to the procedural economy benefi ts 
enjoyed by the US with its system of uncontrolled plea-bargaining where 
over 95% of all cases are resolved by a guilty plea.284 An earlier Bulgarian 
system of consensual resolution of cases was applied in around 36.6% 
of cases from 2000 to 2005 but statistics are not available yet for the new 
system.285 In Guatemala, around 25% of all convictions were achieved via 
“abbreviated procedure” from 1996-1998.286 In the fi rst half of the year 2000, 
22% of misdemeanors and 52% of felonies were resolved in the Argentine 
province of Buenos Aires by using the abbreviated procedure.287 In Spain it 
has been estimated that between 15 and 30% of cases are resolved with a 
conformidad.288 The fi gure for Italy’s patteggiamento was between 17 and 21% 
of cases in the misdemeanor courts and between 34 and 42% in the mid-level 
trial courts in the years 1990-1998.289 In the main trial court in the Argentine 
province of Tierra del Fuego, there were 55 regular trials and 52 conformidad-
type procedures in over three years. Of those who went to trial, 67.02% were 
convicted and 32.98% acquitted, whereas 81.69% were convicted and 16.9% 
282 US (p. 6).
283 Id., p. 8.
284 US (p. 1). In 2001 over 96% of federal cases ended in plea bargains. E. Lichtblau, Ashcroft 
Limiting Prosecutors’ Use of Plea Bargains, New York Times, Sept. 23, 2003, at A1, A25. 
Similar statistics exist, however, in SC (p. 17), where, in 2004-05, 97% of all district court cases 
(excluding dismissals) were resolved through plea bargaining, 93% of Sheriff’s court summary 
proceedings and 81% of Sheriff’s Court solemn proceedings. The percentage dropped, however, 
to 63% in high court jury cases.
285 BU (pp. 13-14, where less than 5% of proposed settlements were rejected by the trial 
courts).
286 Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at 423.
287 Langer, supra note 13, at 56-57.
288 Gimeno Sendra et al., supra note 264, at 330.
289 Langer, supra note 13, at 52-53.
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acquitted in the cases resolved without trial. In the lower correctional courts, 
however, nearly all the cases resolved without trial ended in convictions.290
 The consensual mechanisms have, on the other hand, not been successful 
in signifi cantly unburdening the courts in countries where defendants feel they 
can get better results by demanding trial according to the normal procedures 
and either depending on the lenient sentencing practices of the courts,291 or 
their successful manipulation of the normal procedures.
4. Simplifi ed and Abbreviated Trial Proceedings
4.1. Abbreviated Trial Procedures Not Involving Admissions or 
Stipulations of Guilt
4.1.1. Statutorily Regulated Trials Based on the Investigative Dossier
The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, the chief aim of which was a turn 
to adversary procedure and an oral trial buttressed with a strict prohibition on 
use of evidence from the dossier of the preliminary investigation, introduced 
the giudizio abbreviato, which ironically allows the defendant to elect to be 
tried by the judge of the investigation on the basis of the written evidence 
in the preliminary investigation dossier in classical inquisitorial style.292 The 
inducement to select the old inquisitorial written trial is a discount of one-
third on what otherwise would have been the sentence, and a reduction to 
thirty years of any sentence of life imprisonment.293 The punishment following 
an abbreviated trial in the court of appeal, however, can be freely negotiated 
between the parties.294
 Since amendments to the law in 1999, the defendant may compel trial 
by the abbreviated procedure, even if the public prosecutor and judge are 
290 Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 307.
291 In CR (pp. 22-24), there were only two “requests for rendering judgment” since 2004, likely 
due to the mild criminal policy in Croatia, where 67.48% of all sentences are suspended and those 
prison sentences imposed are often within 1/2 of the upper limit, thus making the consensual 
procedures irrelevant. Only 1% of cases were concluded with the “abbreviated procedure” in 
El Salvador from the time of its introduction on March 20, 1998, through May 30, 1999, while 
victim-offender conciliation resolved 31.77% of cases in that time. Amaya Cóbar, supra note 
188, at 408-09.
292 For an interesting ancient precursor to this procedure, one could see the procedure developed 
in the Paris abbey courts around 1300, whereby the accused could “accept the inquest,” or 
stipulate to the results of the examination conducted by the investigating magistrate which had 
the advantage of allowing the accused to avoid being tortured. Dawson, supra note 73, at 51. 
293 IT (pp. 18-19).
294 In such cases the defense will renounce certain appellate grounds, IT (pp. 18-19).
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in opposition.295 In addition to basing the judgment on the contents of the 
preliminary investigation dossier, the defendant in the giudizio abbreviato, 
since 1999, may request to be interrogated, and may even ask the judge to call 
additional witnesses or adduce other types of evidence. If the judge, however, 
determines that this would defeat the goal of procedural economy underlying 
the abbreviated procedure, she may insist the case follow the full-blown trial 
procedure. Once the judge allows the defendant, however, to offer additional 
evidence, the prosecutor may offer additional evidence in rebuttal and the 
judge may also sua sponte ask that further evidence be taken.296
 In Bulgaria, the judge may sentence below the minimum sentence if the 
defendant agrees to be tried based on the contents of the investigative fi le and 
agrees to curtail the questioning of certain witnesses and experts.297 Similar 
procedures have also been introduced in some Latin American jurisdictions298 
and in the former Soviet republics on the Baltic Sea.299
4.1.2. Statutorily Regulated Simplifi cation of the Taking of the Evidence
Amendments to the 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure have allowed 
the prosecutor and defense to stipulate to include any and all documents 
contained in the preliminary investigation dossier in the “trial dossier,” which 
actually goes to court and is admissible during the trial.300 The code originally 
limited this trial fi le to pretrial depositions conducted in an adversary fashion, 
guaranteeing the confrontation rights of the defendant and other evidence 
“which cannot be repeated at trial.”301
295 IT (p. 20). Certain opinions of the Italian Constitutional Court determined that the statute had 
to be interpreted to give the defendant this evidentiary initiative and legislation codifi ed these 
changes. The victim also has no control over the decision, IT (p. 18).
296 IT (p. 18). In cases where additional evidence is proffered, the procedure begins to look like a 
trial in an inquisitorial country like the Netherlands, where most of the evidence is merely read 
to the trial court and only selected witnesses testify.
297 BU (p. 11).
298 In §§500-501 CCP-Neuquen (Argentina), the public prosecutor, defense and the complaining 
witness can request that the trial be held on the basis of the preliminary investigation fi le. The 
trial consists then in the parties indicating the evidence which supports their positions and 
the defendant may request to be heard. The judge then decides the guilt question. There is no 
statutory reduction of the punishment, however. Vitale, supra note 134, at 366-67.
299 In Estonia, a “trial on the fi le” is possible in all cases but those punished by life imprisonment. 
ES (§233 CCP). The accused may ask to be interrogated, ES (§237(5) CCP) and may then be 
acquitted by the judge or will get a mandatory 1/3 reduction in what would otherwise have been 
the appropriate sentence. ES (§238 CCP). In Latvia, the accused may “agree to not require the 
taking of evidence during the trial.” LA (§71(6) CCP).
300 IT (p. 20).
301 IT (§421 CPP), see E. Amodio & E. Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Lat Country: 
the 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 Temple L. Rev. 1211, 1217 (1989).
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 While there are no statutory discounts in sentence coupled with such 
stipulations, it cannot be ruled out that bargaining could take place around 
negotiations to stipulate to the reading of certain testimony to expedite the 
trial process. 
 Spain introduced an abbreviated trial procedure in 1988 which applies to 
cases in which the maximum sentence of deprivation of liberty could be nine 
years. It involves a streamlined preliminary investigation in which the public 
prosecutor, rather than the investigating magistrate, assumes the initiative in 
the gathering of evidence, and in which the procedural requirements at the trial 
stage have also been streamlined. The defendant does not necessarily have any 
role in selecting this procedure and no statutory discounts are involved.302
4.1.3. Non-Statutorily Regulated Simplifi cation of the Taking of the 
Evidence
While most Absprachen in Germany involve agreements reached between 
prosecutor, defense and court involve the negotiating of an in-court 
confession,303 they will not infrequently involve negotiations to shorten the 
trial by not calling certain witnesses, or by withdrawing motions for the taking 
of further evidence.304
4.1.4. Criticism
In Bulgaria, the abbreviated procedure has been praised by the public 
prosecutor and the judiciary because of the saving of time and resources and 
by defense counsel due to the benefi ts accorded in sentencing. However it 
has also been criticized for undermining the principle of material truth and, 
from the victim’s point of view, for being too lenient.305 The pioneering Italian 
legislation has been subject to little criticism because it has been seldom 
used.306
302 SP (p. 4).
303 See section 4.2.4., infra.
304 Such bargaining between prosecution and defense to shorten the trial also exists in BR (p. 
8).
305 BU (p. 12).
306 IT (p. 19).
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4.2.  Inducing and Bargaining for Confessions to Expedite and 
Simplify the Trial
4.2.1. Introduction
From the beginnings of criminal procedure, the confession has always been 
the main simplifi er and expediter of criminal proceedings. When the defendant 
has confessed, the preliminary investigation may be curtailed or terminated. 
Similarly, when the defendant admits the charges at trial, the taking of 
evidence at trial may be curtailed, or the case may move directly on to closing 
arguments and deliberation of the court.
4.2.2. The Pre-trial Confession as Trigger for Expedited or Simplifi ed 
Proceedings
Many of the expedited trial procedures used in Europe307 and Latin America308 
allow for a skipping of the preliminary investigation and the setting of a 
trial within a short period of time when the defendant has given a credible 
confession to the police or the authorized investigative offi cial during the 
pretrial stage. In Norway, a credible pretrial confession will lead to a case 
being tried by a single professional judge, rather than a mixed or jury court.309 
In Denmark, a confession will trigger a summary trial without even the fi ling 
of an accusatory pleading.310
 In Japan, a person who confesses will normally be released from pretrial 
detention and, following a substantially simpler trial will usually be sentenced 
to either credit for time served or a substantially more mitigated punishment 
than she would otherwise have gotten had she remained silent and fought the 
307 Such as the Italian giudizio immediato, or the German beschleunigtes Verfahren, which 
may apply when the “facts are clear.” See Thaman, supra note 39, at 308-09. Some countries 
also apply expedited trial procedures to misdemeanors or crimes which do not involve pretrial 
detention. See the Chilean procedimiento simplifi cado, CH (§388 CCP), which applies where 
the maximum punishment could be 540 days deprivation of liberty and which allows the control 
judge (juez de garantías) to impose punishment and which, like the new Spanish expedited 
trials, seeks to induce an early conformidad or acuerdo reparatorio, CH (§241 CCP), which is 
similar to victim-offender conciliations. Riego, supra note 127, at 470-71.
308 This is allowed in the Argentine Province of Neuquen, as long as there is no objection from 
the public prosecutor, victim or the defense, the case is not complicated and no pretrial detention 
is involved. §§497-500 CPP-Neuquen. Vitale, supra note 134, at 366.
309 This procedure is only applicable if the maximum punishment is less than 10 years. The public 
prosecutor must consent, no formal accusatory pleading is fi led, and there will be virtually no 
further taking of evidence, NO (p. 4).
310 DE (p. 18).
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charges. This has led some critics to characterize such a procedural system 
as one of “plea bargaining” although the Japanese themselves consider their 
system to be the antithesis thereof.311
4.2.3. Confession at Trial as Trigger of Expedited and Simplifi ed 
Proceedings
In many civil law jurisdictions the trial commences with the reading of the 
accusatory pleading and the questioning of the defendant as to whether 
he or she wishes to admit the charges. As was seen above, with Spanish 
conformidad, applicable in cases punishable by less than six years in the 
normal courts,312 the defendant will then be immediately sentenced. In some 
countries, statutory provisions allow for either a greatly truncated taking of 
evidence313 or even, in some cases, transition directly to closing statements 
and deliberation of the court.314 In other countries, there need not even be 
reasons given for the factual or legal underpinnings of the guilt-fi nding, 
311 Johnson, supra note 56, at 142-45.
312 In Kazakhstan, the procedure applies only to crimes of slight or mid-level seriousness, 
KA (§363(1) CCP) and in Lithuania grave or major crimes are excluded. LI (§269(1) CCP). 
§406(1) of the Draft-CCP of Turkmenistan would apply the procedure only to cases where no 
preliminary investigation was conducted.
313 In NE (p. 21) the confession does not theoretically lead to a truncation of evidence-taking, 
but in reality little corroboration is needed for a conviction (fi nding the body of a murder victim 
would be suffi cient). In NI (§271 CCP), following a spontaneous admission of the charges at 
trial, the judge may suspend the case for fi ve days to take further evidence or may set the case 
over for sentencing without trial in 15 days. In some countries, following a confession, the 
court will question the defendant and the victim and immediately move to closing argument 
and judgment. KA (§363(3) CCP). In §406(3) of the Draft-CCP of Turkmenistan, a confession 
will lead to the questioning of the defendant and the victim, the arguments of the parties and the 
rendering of judgment. In Lithuania, the defendant is thoroughly examined as to the veracity 
of her confession but must waive the oral taking of other evidence. LI (§269(1) CCP). The 
evidence in the preliminary investigation fi le, however, is then read in court, LI (§287(1) CCP). 
Prior to the 2004 CCP, Estonian “simplifi ed proceedings” followed this model. Sillaots, supra 
note 205 at 117-18.
314 BU (p. 11). In DE (pp.18, 28-29), the defendant must not only admit the acts underlying the 
charge but the actual crime charged. Then the case proceeds immediately to sentence without 
any taking of evidence. Both prosecutor and defense must consent to this procedure which has 
been in force since 1911. Such a provision was introduced in the 1993 Russian jury law but was 
seldom used and disappeared in the 2001 Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. S. C. Thaman, 
The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 16 Stanford J. Int’L L. 61, 103-104 (1995). It 
found its way into the CCP of Belarus, BE (§326(1) CCP). The Argentine omisión de pruebas, 
§408 Federal CCP, provides for moving directly to argument following a full confession of 
the defendant, provided that the public prosecutor, the victim, and defense counsel and the 
judge agree. Similar provisions can be found in §377 CPP-La Pampa, and in the CCPs of 
other Argentine provinces such as Salta, Mendoza, San Juan, Santiago del Estero and La Rioja. 
Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 303-04. Such procedures were included in the now obsolete 
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though the sentence must be reasoned.315 Finally, in a third group of countries, 
the court may acquit if, despite the confession, it determines the evidence of 
guilt to be insuffi cient.316
4.2.4. Outright Bargaining for Confessions in the Trial Court
In many systems trial judges have always exercised direct or indirect pressure 
on criminal defendants to admit their guilt so as to simplify the trial. Implicit 
in such pressure is a guarantee or promise that the defendant will receive a 
mitigated sentence.317 As early as 1960, reported decisions of the German 
Supreme Court revealed such pressure applied by trial judges aimed at 
inducing confessions, yet the issue there was whether such pressure violated 
the law prohibiting coerced confessions.318
 It was only in 1982, however, that a German lawyer319 revealed to the 
general legal community what had been going on for years in the German 
criminal trial courts: the fact that in many cases judges, prosecutors and 
defense counsel were negotiating the confessions of defendants in exchange 
for a guaranteed mitigated punishment, so as to simplify and expedite the 
criminal trial.320 While Deal maintained that the practice began with narcotics 
cases, its primary use was in cases of economic and environmental crime, 
where the complicated nature of the cases, the voluminous fi les, and the 
multiplicity of charges that could be fi led made them the most likely candidate 
for trial-simplifying bargaining.321 The secrecy of this practice was required 
inasmuch as such negotiations appeared to clearly violate the principle of 
1973 Costa Rican CCP. Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 436 and exist in Panama as well, 
PA (§2243 Judicial Code).
315 NE (pp. 11, 21).
316 BU (p. 11).
317 Although no bargaining apparently takes place in NE (p. 21), there is an implicit recognition 
that a mitigated sentence will follow and Dutch judges have a huge discretion in all cases to 
mitigate, even down to a fi ne of only 1 Euro. In earlier German jurisprudence, a confession was 
an accepted mitigating factor as long as it was motivated by remorse and inner acceptance of 
guilt. Under the modern practice of Absprachen, however, see infra, this is no longer the case, 
GE (p. 56).
318 BGHSt 14, 189, 190 (1960), cited in Thaman, supra note 39, at 310-11.
319 Writing under the pseudonym “Detlev Deal aus Mauschelhausen” in Der Strafverteidiger 
(1982), at 545, GE (p. 46).
320 GE (pp. 40-41). Even legal scholars who claimed to expertise in German criminal law and 
procedure were completely unaware of what was going on in the German courtrooms. See J. 
H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 204 
(1979). Altenhain maintains that the practice probably did not exist in its present form before 
1970, while Hamm claims such deals have always taken place, GE (p. 68), evidence of which 
could be the decision of the German Supreme Court cited above.
321 GE (pp. 69-70). Since most such crimes did not have an obvious victim, they were treated as 
less-serious and thus suitable for the under the table procedures. Id.
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offi cial investigation of criminal cases.322 Much as was the case in the US, 
the practice was fi nally challenged before the higher courts, and the German 
Supreme Court fi nally has issued a number of rulings approving of confession 
bargaining, provided that certain minimal procedural guarantees are met.
 The main decision in this respect, was that of August 28, 1997,323 in which 
a kind of rulebook for confession bargaining was laid out. The German 
Supreme Court stated that for a deal or Absprache to be accepted, the court 
may indicate a maximum sentence lower than the maximum sentence 
provided by law, but may not fi rmly set out the magnitude of the punishment 
to be imposed and, indeed, must advise the defendant that it might exceed 
the indicated punishment if new facts arise not known to the court at the time 
of the negotiations.324 Although the discussions may occur off the record 
and even outside of court,325 they must be publicly announced in court and 
put on the record.326 The results of the negotiations must be communicated, 
of course, to the defendant, who seldom directly takes part,327 and the lay 
assessors, who are also seldom directly involved.328 Although the aggrieved 
party has full participatory rights during the trial in certain cases, especially 
those of sexual violence, as the “collateral complainant” (Nebenklägerin), and 
should be included in the discussions about negotiating an Absprache, this 
often does not happen.329 The collateral complainant may appeal the “deal” 
but may not do so on grounds of an inappropriate punishment, the most 
likely ground she would allege.330 The punishment imposed in the end must 
322 GE (p. 40).
323 BGHSt 43, 195, GE (p. 44). For an English translation of this decision, see Thaman, supra 
note 19, at 145-50.
324 GE (p. 58). Research has shown that, despite this language in the jurisprudence, the maximum 
indicated sentence usually always turns out to be the actual sentence or at most three to four 
months less, thus making the German practice more similar to American plea-bargaining in 
practice. The fi nal sentence never exceeds the indicated maximum, GE (p. 58-9).
325 A German judge told me that much of the negotiations traditionally took place when the 
judge, prosecutor and defense counsel took breaks in the trial to smoke. Thus, ironically, non-
smoking judges and parties were generally involved in less such bargaining.
326 GE (pp. 45, 53). Investigations have shown, however, that the deal is often not put on the 
record, or is only briefl y noted, because trial judges are fearful if they put too many details on 
the record, they will be reversed on appeal, GE (p. 62). In BR (p. 8), however, the negotiations 
are never put on the record, as was the case in Germany before the 1980’s or in the US before 
the 1960’s.
327 GE (p. 43).
328 GE (p. 43); this aspect of the 1997 decision, required by the principle of publicity, has not 
led to the inclusion of the lay assessors in the great majority of cases, Dubber, supra note 
136, at 583, and yet this fact has not led to any reversals of judgments rendered as a result of 
Absprachen, GE (pp. 54-55).
329 GE (pp. 67-68).
330 Aggrieved parties who do not constitute themselves as “collateral complainants” have no right 
to appeal. No “deal”, however, has been overturned upon appeal of a collateral complainant, 
GE (pp. 67-68).
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still be proportionate to the defendant’s guilt331 and there may be no charge-
bargaining: the charge must represent the actual level of defendant’s guilt.332 
The defendant may not be subject to any explicit or implicit coercion to make 
a judicial confession which would result in a violation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination or the right to human dignity.333 Although defendants want 
to know the minimum and maximum sentence, the prevailing view is that the 
judge should not announce this. It is, however, clear, that the announcement 
of a too-wide gap between maximum sentence and sentence offered by the 
trial judge, as often happens in the U.S., will result in the agreement being 
nullifi ed due to its coercive nature.334
 The defendant may not be forced to waive the right to appeal during the 
negotiations.335 This is a ticklish point and many cases have been reversed 
on appeal on this ground.336 Judge and prosecutor are, of course, eager for a 
waiver, but they must not insist on it until after judgment is pronounced and 
must hope defense counsel will be a good sport and convince the defendant not 
to appeal.337 Seven days after pronouncement of judgment, the case becomes 
fi nal if no appeal is entered and then the formal written judgment may be 
more skeletal as there will be no appeal.338 Once a “deal” is appealed, it is 
more likely to be reversed because the evidence in the record will inevitably 
be thinner than after a full trial.
331 GE (p. 47).
332 The German Constitutional Court found that “deals” were not clearly unconstitutional, but 
held that the principles of legal evaluation of facts and imposition of punishment cannot be 
thrown completely open to bargaining, BVerfG NStZ 1987, at 419, GE (p. 46). There have been 
cases, however, in which an “especially serious” crime has been reclassifi ed as a normal crime, 
or a normal crime as a less serious crime. Although there has been no evidence of overcharging 
a particular count, as occurs in the US, there has been some evidence of adding numerous lesser 
offenses, which are related to the more serious offense, which will then be dismissed due to 
the prosecutor’s unsureness as to whether they can be proved at trial as part of negotiations, 
GE (pp. 59-60). Although the German CCP only technically allows dismissal of lesser offenses 
punishing the same conduct, in practice prosecutors have bargained away “similarly grave” 
offenses. This gives a clever lawyer possibility to dismiss just those charges which would be 
considered to be the most serious at time of sentencing, GE (p. 41). 
333 The judge may offer a lower sentence, but it may not constitute an advantage not provided by 
law (i.e. be disproportionate to guilt). The courts are split as to whether the judge may actually 
indicate the approximate sentence he or she will impose, GE (p. 56).
334 One case found a gap between six or seven years maximum, and a two years suspended 
sentence if the defendant confessed, invalidated the confession on grounds of coercion, GE (pp. 
57-58).
335 The defendant may negotiate away his right to appeal, however, in some countries, such as: 
BR (p. 8) and the US.
336 GE (pp. 64-65).
337 Defense counsel who are not good sports and encourage or let their clients appeal will not be 
dealt with any more. GE (p. 64).
338 GE (p. 63).
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 Because courts have “encouraged” waiver of the right to appeal despite the 
questionable legality of this tactic, the appellate courts have struggled to fi nd 
a bright line rule for the courts to follow in this area. Recently, the following 
rule was pronounced by the German Supreme Court sitting en banc: (1) the 
court must not mention waiver of appeal or infl uence it; (2) the presiding 
judge must instruct the defendant after judgment that he has of an unlimited 
right to appeal, and; (3) the waiver of appeal after judgment is without force 
if it is not preceded by an advisement of the right to appeal.339 Critics claim 
that the admonition as to the right to appeal “cures” any court violations of the 
prohibition against infl uencing or pressuring the defendant.340 
 Normally the trial judge must be convinced of the credibility of the 
confession and even engage in questioning or taking other evidence to 
achieve this conviction.341 While some cases involving Absprachen have 
been reversed because the confession was merely a procedural act which did 
not reveal suffi cient evidence to prove guilt,342 in other decisions, however, 
courts have accepted confessions as the basis for guilt-fi ndings and mitigated 
sentences when the so-called confession has been as bereft of details about 
actual guilt as is an American plea of guilty or nolo contendere.343
 In cases involving economic crimes the bargaining for confessions 
sometimes begins during the preliminary investigation, at the same time as 
would occur when the details of penal or diversion orders are discussed, and, 
if the latter do not result, a sentence reduction would result in the event of a 
confession when the case is set for trial.344 During pretrial negotiations, of 
course, only prosecution and defense are involved. The preliminary hearing 
is also a place where the parties “feel each other out.” If a deal is reached 
pretrial, there is great pressure on the trial judge, who always plays a major 
role in negotiations in the trial court, to accept the deal.345
339 BGH NJW 2005, 1440, 1445, GE (p. 65). According to Altenhain’s research, a majority of 
“deals” still violate these rules, GE (p. 75).
340 GE (p. 66).
341 GE (p. 60).
342 GE (p. 40). Mere statements that “it was like that,” or stipulations to the correctness of the 
charge, have been rejected, because German law does not accept such stipulation. One court 
ruled that the confession must be “at least concrete enough, that it can be tested, whether it is 
suffi ciently consistent with the material in the fi le and that no further investigation of the facts 
appears to be necessary.” GE (pp. 61-62).
343 Some courts have accepted perfunctory acceptances of guilt, claiming the goal of procedural 
economy will be lost if the judge must nevertheless meticulously prove the credibility of the 
confession, GE (pp. 61-62). For an example of such a decision, see BGH NStZ, 1999, 92, 
translated into English in Thaman, supra note 19, at 150-52.
344 GE (p. 41).
345 But most discussions take place in the trial court when defense counsel has more complete 
discovery of the state’s case, GE (pp. 41-42). For a recent comparative analysis of the impact 
of the participation of the German judge in confession bargaining, compared to the regime 
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 Outright confession bargaining undoubtedly exists in many countries with 
civil law-inspired procedural rules.346
4.2.5. Criticisms of the Confession-Based Procedures
As might be expected, practitioners in Germany praised the practice 
of Absprachen on grounds of procedural economy, while the academic 
community was overwhelmingly critical because of the perceived violations 
of the right to a fair trial; equal protection, the presumption of innocence, the 
principles of offi cial investigation and that only judges may impose judgment 
on the basis of evidence presented at trial.347
 Opponents have also stressed the fact that German law is antipathetical 
to bargaining and that the procedures have no basis in the codifi ed law. The 
argument is, that judges may not assess the evidence or assess punishment 
before having heard the evidence, but proponents emphasize that trial judges 
do this all the time when they read the fi le and pre-evaluate the facts before 
trial in deciding whether to impose pretrial detention or set the case for 
trial.348 The German Supreme Court has also held that the bargaining opened 
up by the introduction in 1974 of diversion proceedings and the opportunity 
principle in relation to minor offenses, in its day condemned as a kind of 
Verdachtsstrafe or punishment upon suspicion,349 introduced an exception to 
the legality principle and opened up the door to bargaining among the parties 
and the judge which carried over to more serious cases.350
 Despite the opposition of the academic community,351 the overwhelming 
view of practitioners who have to work, day-in, day-out, in the criminal 
justice system, is that Absprachen are here to stay.352 While the former Social 
of judicial involvement in several US states, see J. I. Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea 
Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 199 (2006).
346 Confession bargaining to simplify trials existed under the now obsolete Costa Rican CCP of 
1973. Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 436.
347 GE (p. 46).
348 GE (pp. 49-50). Judges also allow dismissals of charges and imposition of measures in 
diversion proceedings, and this factor was emphasized by the German Supreme Court in its 
1997 decision to show that bargaining and the opportunity principle are not entirely alien to 
German law. 
349 Opponents such as Weigend and Schünemann, still maintain this view. GE (p. 52).
350 DE (pp. 49-52, 69).
351 Most in the German academic community want “deals” legislatively prohibited, or at least 
want the rules of the 1997 Supreme Court decision to be codifi ed. A minority of academia 
favors a new code of criminal procedure with more adversarial principles, so that one does not 
have an open confl ict between inquisitorial and adversarial principles, GE (pp. 77-78).
352 Altenhain, in his study, found a favorability rating of 5.84 on a 7 point scale, GE (p. 75). Most 
practitioners also feel, while the rules laid out in the 1997 decision of the Supreme Court are 
workable, they are too strict and unrealistic and thereby defeat the purpose of speeding up the 
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Democratic government favored a legislative solution, and a draft law based 
on the 1997 Supreme Court decision was even circulated,353 the currently 
ruling Great Coalition of is no longer pushing amendment of the code.354
4.2.6. Statistics Relating to Use of the Confession-Based Procedures
German Absprachen now are involved in the resolution of perhaps 30-50 % 
of German criminal cases.355 The great majority of the cases are still those 
involving economic or white-collar crime, where a deal is attempted in 100% 
of the cases,356 but it is also used in nearly all kinds of cases, including those 
of attempted homicide and manslaughter.357
 In Denmark, 13.5% of all cases were handled as summary trials following 
a credible confession by the defendant.358 By 2002 in Estonia, the “simplifi ed 
trial,” which functioned from 1996 until 2004, 59.8% of all cases were handled 
with a confession and reduced punishment.359
5. Conclusion
It is clear that consensual procedures which lead to a truncation or elimination 
of phases of criminal procedure – whether it be the preliminary investigation, 
the preliminary hearing, the trial itself, or even the rendering of a reasoned 
judgment – are here to stay. Most practitioners welcome them due to their 
effects on procedural economy,360 whereas academicians tend to be skeptical, 
highlighting the violation of the cherished principles of criminal procedure 
they studied in school, the pressure such procedures place on defendants, 
the sacrifi ces in the area of truth-ascertainment, and the exclusion of 
resolution of cases. They especially underline the prohibition of waiving the right to appeal, 
GE (pp. 74-75).
353 GE (pp. 77-78). Proponents of legislation feel it is the only mechanism to get judges to follow 
the rules, because they do not hold the decisions of the Supreme Court to be binding.
354 GE (p. 79).
355 B. Huber, Criminal Procedure in Germany, in Hatchard et al, supra note 203, at 159-60.
356 GE (pp. 74-75).
357 GE (pp. 71, 74). It has been deemed not suitable to murder cases, where a mandatory life 
sentence (where one actually serves no more than 25 years) must be imposed.
358 DE (p. 18).
359 Sillaots, supra note 205, at 115-16.
360 CR (p. 24); it has been calculated in SC (p. 19), that a plea in the High Court costs 324 
pounds whereas a full trial estimated at 13,879 pounds. The respective sums in Sheriff’s 
solemn procedure, are 117 pounds for a plea and 6,398 pounds for a trial; in Sheriff’s summary 
proceedings, a plea costs 78 pounds and a trial, 1463 pounds. 
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victims.361 At times the public itself has also been unwilling to accept the new 
procedures.362
 The challenge for legislators and courts, where legislators are unwilling 
to act, is to fi nd the right balance between the various forms of criminal 
procedure available for the trial of various types of criminal cases and to make 
sure that none of the forms presents a substantial risk that innocent persons 
will be convicted of crime and that convictions are based on procedures 
which adequately allow the courts to assess the credibility and strength of the 
evidence.
 The new forms must also offer a suffi cient enough incentive to the parties 
to avoid the normal full-blown trial procedures. So far this has not happened 
in Italy, where too few defendants choose the consensual procedures, Italy’s 
court system is still over-burdened, and it continues to be condemned by the 
Eur.Ct. HR due to violations of the right to a speedy trial.363
 German academicians who are opposed to the practice of Absprachen, 
believe that a system patterned on the penal order should be applied to all 
crimes across the board, but should be based on a fully adversarial preliminary 
investigation in which the right of the defendant to confront and cross-examine 
the witnesses would be protected to the greatest extent possible, and where the 
prosecutor, at the end of the investigation, would propose a resolution of the 
case which could be accepted or rejected by the defendant. If rejected, the bulk 
of the evidence gathered at the preliminary investigation would be admissible 
and would, in any event, provide a good foundation for a judge to write a 
reasoned judgment justifying the decision on guilt and punishment.364 The 
accused could then be punished by no more than the punishment suggested by 
the public prosecutor in the proposed resolution of the case, thus avoiding any 
problems of reformatiu in peius.365
 A lawyer’s draft, on the other hand, suggests a reform of the penal code 
which would require a reduction in punishment of at least one-fourth in case 
of an Absprache and a reduction of the mandatory minimum sentence by 
one-half.366 This has been criticized on grounds of equal protection, because 
of a lack of differentiation between a “deal” based on a truthful confession, 
or restitution, or one just based on a decision not to call witnesses, for 
instance.367 
361 CR (p. 24).
362 In IT (p. 22), the criticism has mainly been that the consensual procedures have reinforced 
the inequality in the enforcement of the laws.
363 IT (p. 22).
364 See GE (p. 79)
365 This last provision has been criticized due to fears that a lid on the punishment will mean few 
people will accept the prosecutor’s offer, GE (p. 80).
366 GE (p. 82).
367 GE (pp. 82-84).
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 In the last analysis, one should pose a question which will sound heretical 
in the countries of the civil law: if one wishes to resolve the overwhelming 
bulk of cases consensually and provides adequate incentives for defendants 
to renounce their right to a trial with all the guarantees, shouldn’t one offer 
those few persons who wish to gamble a full adversarial trial before a court 
where the outcome is not more or less set in stone at the outset, that is of 
course, before a classic jury court, where the triers of fact and guilt have no 
previous knowledge of the case and can look at the facts through the non-
bureaucratized368 eyes of lay persons. It is, of course, only with such a court 
that the defense has a real “trump card” to play in the negotiations with court 
or prosecutor.369
 But even having a jury court as the fi nal arbiter of guilt or innocence is 
meaningless, if the system of consensual resolution of cases is more a child 
of the inquisitorial practice of coercing confessions rather than an adversarial 
procedure between two more or less equal opponents, as was the case with 
the Medieval practice of wergeld or composition between victim-accuser 
and defendant. Unfortunately American plea bargaining, and any system that 
makes the “deal” so tantalizing that going to trial becomes a risky endeavor, 
smacks more of inquisitorial coercion of confessions than a contract between 
equals.
 Furthermore, no system which allows consensual resolution of cases 
which could result in deprivation of liberty, especially where there is 
inherent coercion, should allow the defendant to will his or her judgment of 
conviction without having a real procedure for a judge to verify that there 
is a factual basis for the plea. The US does not have such a guarantee, and 
therefore Mirjan Damaska is correct, when commenting on the practice of 
plea-bargaining in the international criminal tribunals, that guilty pleas in 
such a context should look more like the German Absprache, where the judge 
must still render judgment and provide reasons, and where the “guilty plea” 
consists in a detailed confession of what, in reality, the defendant did to merit 
the conviction.370
368 For an opinion that he was a better judge when he was young, inexperienced, and not yet 
bureaucratized, see the interview with the current “star” investigating magistrate of Spain’s 
National Court, R. Montero, Fernando Grande-Marlaska: En el ojo del huracán, El País 
Semanal, June 11, 2006, at 12.
369 For a similar suggestion, see B. Schünemann, Refl exionen über die Zukunft des deutschen 
Strafverfahrens, in Strafrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht. Festschrift Für Gerd Pfeiffer 
482 (1988).
370 Damaska, supra note 4, at 1037-38.
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Appendix 1
Questionaire for Country Studies
I. Organization of Criminal Procedure (More Serious Crimes)
A. Pre-Trial Stage
1. Form of criminal investigation.
a. Is there a formal preliminary investigation in which the evidence is gathered before the 
case is formally charged and brought to trial? If so, is it conducted by an investigating 
magistrate or prosecutor or other state offi cial?
b. Is the investigation informally carried out by police, prosecutor, or other body? Describe.
c. In arresting suspects and investigating crime, are law enforcement offi cials required 
to pursue all reported cases if they appear to constitute criminal violations? (Legality 
Principle). If not (opportunity principle) is their discretion limited by law?
d. Do defendant and/or victim (aggrieved party) have the right to conduct parallel 
investigations? If so, may they independently present their evidence to the court or must 
their evidence be funneled through the offi cial investigator (1.1a)?
2. Confessions and Admissions as Proof of Guilt: Interrogation Practice
a. Are police allowed to interrogate criminal suspects? 
b. If so, may the police legally interrogate a suspect in the absence of counsel before the 
case is turned over to the offi cial investigator or prosecutor? If so, must the suspect be 
advised of the right to remain silent before questioning? Must the suspect be advised of the 
right to consult with counsel? Must the consult with counsel before the police attempt to 
interrogate? If the police fail to advise a suspect, may any statement given by the statement 
be used at trial? May any indirect evidence resulting from the statement (physical fruits, 
witnesses) be introduced at trial? 
c. If defendant has a right to counsel during interrogation, how is counsel provided to the 
indigent suspect? Is the suspect/defendant allowed to waive the right to counsel? Are 
confessions/admissions given in absence of counsel admissible in court?
d. Is the head of the investigation (investigating magistrate, prosecutor) allowed to interrogate 
the suspect/defendant? (If so, answer same questions as in 1.2.b and c.)
e. Are law enforcement offi cials allowed to bargain for confessions during the pretrial stages? 
(by offering release from custody, dismissal of other charges, other favors, etc.)
3. Which public offi cial or body, if any, reviews the suffi ciency of the evidence prior to 
charging? Pre-trial judge, investigating magistrate, trial judge, panel of judges, grand 
jury?
a. Is this at a formal adversarial hearing, or conducted ex parte by the offi cial or body? Does 
the aggrieved party participate in this proceeding? Describe.
4.  If there is suffi cient evidence to charge the case, must the case be charged (legality 
principle)? If so, who brings the charges? If the case is not charged, is the prosecutor’s 
discretion limited by law (statute or case law)? May the aggrieved party appeal to a judge 
or other body to compel prosecution in the event the prosecutor does not charge the case or 
undercharges it?
a. May the aggrieved party or any other citizen bring criminal charges? 
B. Trial Stage (Post-Charge)
1. Once the case is charged in the trial court, may the charging offi cial (usually prosecutor) 
dismiss or reduce the charges on his or her own motion? If he/she feels there is insuffi cient 
evidence to proceed? May the judge block the dismissal of the case? May the aggrieved 
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party? If the dismissal is blocked, which offi cial presents the case at trial? May the aggrieved 
party act as private prosecutor?
2. May the defendant control the adjudication of his or her case by pleading guilty and 
preventing the hearing of the evidence and judgment by the trier of the facts? (if so, answer 
further, below, in section V.a )
3. Even if a defendant admits guilt or tries to plead guilty, must the court still pronounce 
sentence according to the same rules as used in the normal procedure? 
II. Organization of Criminal Procedure (Variations for Lesser Crimes)
A. Procedure for Most Serious Crimes
1. In the prosecution of what types of crimes is the above-described procedure employed? 
Crimes punishable by more than a certain number of years deprivation of liberty? Death 
Penalty? Are other criteria used? (crimes against the person, crimes against national 
security, etc.)
2. What is the composition of the court in which the above-described procedures are used? 
If jury, how many jurors, how many professional judges. If mixed court, how many lay 
assessors and how many judges? If professional bench, how many judges?
B. Are there Different Procedures for Less Serious Crimes?
1. Is there an elimination or simplifi cation of the preliminary investigation phase (IA.1, 
above)? Describe
2. Are there any changes in practices of state offi cials in relation to the legality principle? Is 
there increased discretion not to charge such cases? Increased ability to dismiss without 
judicial or aggrieved party intervention? Is private prosecution by the aggrieved party or 
others allowed in relation to this level of crime? Explain.
3. What is the composition of the court for the trial of less serious crimes? (answer as in 
II.A.2.)
III. Informal Mechanisms to Avoid the Full-Blown Trial (as in I)
A. May the prosecutor choose to charge a crime less serious than the facts would warrant, so 
as to avoid the trial court or procedure required for serious crimes (i.e. jury trial, mixed 
court), in order for the case to be tried according to the procedure for lesser trials (i.e., 
without preliminary investigation, with only professional judges)? (as in French/Belgian 
correctionnalisation)
1. May the aggrieved party object to the case being so charged? May the defendant?
2. May a judge sua sponte prevent such a charging practice?
3. Is this practice approved by statute, case law? Has it been condemned by courts, in the 
literature? For what reasons?
4. Does bargaining between prosecutor and defendant sometimes precede this choice of the 
prosecutor? If so, describe.
B. May the court sua sponte decide that a case, which could be tried according to the procedure 
for serious crimes, shall be tried according to the procedure for lesser crimes? (as in English 
either-way offenses)?
1. May the aggrieved party object? May the defendant?
2. Is practice approved by statute, case law? Explain. Has the procedure been condemned by 
the courts, in the literature? For what reasons?
3. Does bargaining between defendant, prosecutor or court sometimes precede this choice? If 
so, describe.
C. Are there statistics as to how often the above procedures are used?
D. How long have these procedures been in use?
1008 STEPHEN C. THAMAN 
IV. May the Prosecutor Replace the Charge with a Proposed Judgment which, if Accepted 
by the Defendant, will Result in Imposition of Judgment without Formal Charge or Trial 
(Penal Orders)
A. If so, for what kinds of offenses is the penal order (or similar procedure) applicable? What 
is the maximum punishment possible according to this procedure?
B. Briefl y describe the procedure: within how many days must the defendant decide? Does the 
aggrieved party have a say in the matter?
C. Does bargaining between defendant and prosecutor sometimes precede the issuance of the 
penal order?
D. Does the court actually pronounce judgment? Is it a judgment of guilt or just imposition of 
punishment? Explain.
E. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure is used?
F. Has the practice been condemned by the courts? In the literature? For what reasons?
G. When was this procedure introduced? Has it undergone substantial change?
V. May the Prosecutor and Defendant agree to Pretrial Diversion, or Suspension of the Charges 
Conditioned on the Defendant Performing certain Acts, Paying Restitution, etc.? 
A. If so, for what kinds of offenses?
B. Briefl y describe the procedure. Must the aggrieved party agree?
C. Does bargaining between defendant and prosecutor sometimes precede the decision to 
conditionally suspend or divert?
D. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure is used?
E. Has the practice been condemned by the courts? In the literature? For what reasons?
F. How long has this practice been in effect? Has it undergone substantial change?
VI. Are there Procedures for Victim-Offender-Reconcilliation?
A. If so, to what kinds of offenses are they applicable?
B. To what extent are they incorporated in the diversion or conditional suspension of charge 
procedures discussed in V. above?
C. Does bargaining between defendant and victim/prosecutor take place?
D. Have there been a history of abuse on the part of powerful defendants? Powerful victims?
E. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure is used and how successful it has 
been?
F. How long have these procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial change?
VII. Guilty Pleas or Stipulations to the Correctness of the Charges
A. May a defendant admit guilt or stipulate to the correctness of the charges and thereby 
completely eliminate the taking of evidence, so that the court may move to the 
pronouncement of sentence and imposition of punishment? (see above, I.B.2.)
B. Does the procedure require a judicial admission of guilt (guilty plea) or is a stipulation 
to the correctness of the charges suffi cient? (plea of nolo contendere, conformidad). May 
the defendant plead guilty or stipulate to the correctness of the charges while maintaining 
innocence?
C. Is the procedure limited to particular types of crimes (i.e. punishable by not more than a 
certain number of years deprivation of liberty) or is it unrestricted?
D. Are there statutorily prescribed discounts in punishment? (as in Italian patteggiamento 
or Russian soglasie so prediavlennom obvinenii). If so, what discount is guaranteed the 
defendant)
E. If there is no statutorily guaranteed discount, are there traditional discounts or “tariffs” 
which one can expect in the courts? If so, explain.
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F. Do negotiations between defendant and prosecutor often precede the guilty plea or 
stipulation? Do they precede the actual charging of the case? May the court participate in 
such negotiations? May the court refuse to accept the negotiated settlement? May the parties 
negotiate both the charges to which the person pleads (or stipulates) and the sentence? 
(as in American plea bargaining). May the aggrieved party participate in the negotiations? 
May the aggrieved party block the execution of the plea or stipulation agreement? Are 
the procedures informal, or regulated by statute? Briefl y describe how the proceedings are 
statutorily regulated.
G. At what point in the procedure may the guilty plea or stipulation be proposed and realized? 
Must it be done before the case is set for trial? Is it done at a particular stage, such as the 
preliminary hearing or on arraignment in the trial court? may it be done during trial?
H. Must the court still pass judgment and provide reasons for the guilt-fi nding and the 
imposed sentence? May the court actually fi nd the defendant not guilty if the fi le reveals an 
impediment to a guilt-fi nding or insuffi ciency of evidence? Does the court actually fi nd the 
defendant guilty, or merely impose punishment? Explain.
I. May the defendant appeal? May the prosecutor require the defendant to give up the right to 
appeal? To give up any other statutory or constitutional rights, other than the right to a fair 
trial, to jury trial, the right to remain silent and other trial rights?
J. Has the procedure been condemned in the courts? In the literature? For what reasons? If it 
has been upheld, explain why the procedure was challenged and the reasons for upholding 
it.
K. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure has been used? If so, please 
summarize.
L. How long have these procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial 
changes?
VIII. Abbreviated Trial Procedures not Involving Admissions or Stipulations of Guilt
A.  May the defendant agree to an abbreviated trial in exchange for a reduction in the 
punishment? If so, explain at what stage of proceedings the decision is made. May the 
aggrieved party, the prosecutor, or the court compel the defendant to stand trial according 
to the ordinary procedure?
B. Briefl y describe the procedure, i.e., is the trial based on the contents of the preliminary 
investigation dossier? May the defendant testify? May witnesses be called?
C. Are there statutorily fi xed discounts for choosing this procedure? If not, are the discounts 
negotiated by the prosecution and defense before the abbreviated trial? If not, are their 
fi xed tariffs?
D. May the prosecutor compel an abbreviated procedure sua sponte or by the way he or she 
charges the case? If so, is it regulated by statute? Describe the procedure briefl y? 
E. Have these procedures been criticized by the courts? In the literature? For what reasons? 
Have they been upheld by the courts? Explain briefl y the grounds on which they were 
challenged and the grounds upon which upheld?
F. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure has been used and in what kind of 
cases? Explain.
G. How long have the procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial change?
IX. Confession Bargaining at Trial (or Otherwise Bargaining to Simplify the Trial)
A. Can the prosecutor, defendant, or even court, engage in discussions aimed at shortening or 
simplifying the trial by encouraging the defendant to confess, or otherwise not to present 
certain evidence? (Like German Absprachen). If so, briefl y explain how these negotiations 
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take place and whether the court is allowed to participate and how. Do the lay assessors or 
the jury get involved in these negotiations?
B. Is the practice regulated by statute or court decision, or does it take place informally?
C. Explain the different types of trial-simplifying agreements which may be made. 
D. May the prosecutor agree to reduce the charges? May the judge agree to a particular 
imposition of punishment? Is the agreement put on the record? May it be enforced if 
violated by the defendant or the court? May it include a promise not to appeal or to give up 
any other important statutory or constitutional rights other than the right to remain silent or 
to present evidence?
E. May the aggrieved party object to the agreement?
F. Have these procedures been criticized by the courts? In the literature? On what grounds? 
Have they been upheld by the courts? Against which attacks? On what reasons?
G. How long have these procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial change?
X. Historical Perspective
A. Is there evidence of consensual procedures in your country at any time in the past, which 
were subsequently superseded by other forms of procedure? Such as compositions, wergeld, 
mechanisms of restitution, etc.
B. Does your country still have areas governed by customary law in which consensual 
procedures for resolving criminal disputes still may be applied? Example: among the 
Miskito Indians in Nicaragua. If so, have these procedures had any infl uence on the reforms 
in the national criminal justice system?
C. Have consultants or representatives from other countries or international organizations 
played a role in the introduction of any of the forms of consensual procedure discussed 
above in your country? I.e. experts from the United States, Germany, the Council of Europe, 
the United Nations, etc.
D. Briefl y summarize the effectiveness of the consensual procedures within the context of the 
normal procedures for resolving criminal cases, their reception among legal practitioners, 
legal scholars and the general public, and the prospects for further reforms in the future.
Appendix 2
Codes of Criminal Procedure
Armenia (AR) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Armenii, http://www.
parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1450&lang=rus
Belarus (BE) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy Kodeks Respubliki Belarus’. Priniat Palatoy 
predstaviteley 24 June 1999. Odobren Sovetom Respubliki 30 June 1999. 
Yuridicheskiy tsentr Press. 2001. St. Petersburg. Augmented by web version 
with changes of to July 22, 2003.
Bolivia (BO) Código de Procedimiento Penal Bolivia. Ley No.1970, Ley del 25 de marzo 
1999.
Chile (CH) Código Procesal Penal, Ley 19,696, Sept. 29, 2000, Final modifi cation, Ley 
19, 762, Oct. 13, 2001.
Estonia (ES) Code of Criminal Procedure, RT 1, 2003, 166, Passed February 12, 2003, 
amended Dec. 17, 2003. 
France (FR) Code de Procédure Pénale, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/
UnCode?code=CPROCPEL.rcv (Last viewed 17 June 2006).
 PLEA-BARGAINING, NEGOTIATING CONFESSIONS & CONSENSUAL RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES 1011
Georgia (GR) Chapter LXIX, amending the Georgian Code of Criminal Procedure, signed 
into law Feb. 13, 2004 by President Mikheil Saakashvili.
Honsuras (HO) Código Procesal Penal, Norma 9-99-E
Kazakhstan (KA) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy Zakon Respublika Kazakhstan. Almaty: Yurist 
(2003). Changes up to Sept. 25, 2003. Originally passed Dec. 13, 1997. No. 
206-I. 
Latvia (LA) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy zakon. Adopted by the Seym. April 21, 2005 
and Proclaimed by the President of the Government on May 11, 2005. With 
changes as of January 19, 2006. BIB. “Biznesa inform~cijas birojs”. Riga. 
2006. Translated by “Biznesa inform~cijas birojs”.
Lithuania (LI) Code of Criminal Procedure Baudziamojo proceso kodekso palvirtinimo ir 
igvendimino Entered into force May 1, 2003.
Model Code of Criminal Procedure for the Commonwealth of Independent States (MCCIS). 
Model’nyy ugolovno-protsessual’niy kodeks dlia stran SNG. Feb. 17, 1996. 
Kommissiia mezhparlamentskoy Assambleiey Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh 
Gosudarstv. Informatsionnyy biulleten’ 1996. No. 10. Appendix.
Moldova (MO) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Moldova. S.A. Cartea, 
Kishinev 2003). No. 122-XY. March 14, 2003. Went into force June 12, 
2003.
Nicaragua (NI) Código Procesal Penal de la Republica de Nicaragua, Ley No. 406, Signed 
by President Dec. 18, 2001.
Panama (PA) Código Judicial. Libro Tercero, Proceso Penal.Gaceta Ofi cial. March 10, 
1987.
Paraguay (PAR) Código Procesal Penal, signed by President of the Republic July 8, 1998.
Russian Soviet Socialist Federated Republic (RSFSR)    
Ugolovnyy-protsessual’nyy kodeks RSFSR, Affi rmed by Supreme Soviet 
of the RSFSR. Oct. 27, 1960 published in Zakony RSFSR i Postanovleniia 
Verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR. Moscow: Supreme Soviet RSFSR (1960)
Russia (RU) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Os’ 89 Moscow 
2006). With amendments up to January 9, 2006.
Tadzhikistan (TA) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Tadzhiskistan. August 17, 
1961. Dushanbe.
Turkmenistan (TU) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Turkmenistana (Proekt)
Uzbekistan (UZ) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Uzbekistan. Confi rmed by 
Law of RU of 9.22.94, No. 2013-XII, went into effect on April 1, 1995. 
Last amendment by N. 254_II on 8.29.2001.
Venezuela (VE) Código Orgánico Procesal Penal, Gaceta Ofi cial # 5208, Jan. 23, 1998. As 
revised in 2001.

